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The increase in violence involving transnational organized crime syndicates in various 
parts of México in the twenty-first century is widely viewed as a challenge to security 
and stability. Some observers have drawn comparisons with the well documented conflict 
in Colombia in the 1980s and 1990s between the Colombian government and the 
Medellín and Cali cartels. Various factors, including the professionalization of the 
Colombian National Police, are viewed as a model for improving the effectiveness of law 
enforcement elsewhere. 
This thesis asks whether a Colombian law enforcement model can be codified, in 
terms of key attributes, to improve security and stability in México. To this end, I explore 
Colombia’s law enforcement strategy in the 1980s and 1990s and identify shifts in 
strategy that might also apply to the current struggle in México. At the same time, I 
identify aspects of the Colombian model that have little or no relevance to contemporary 
México. I argue that the Colombian model can do little to reduce or eliminate the 
production and transportation of illegal narcotics by México-based organized crime 
syndicates; however, a hybrid version of the Colombian model could help reduce the 
overall power of the cartels and enhance security and stability throughout México. 
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I. EXPORTING THE COLOMBIAN MODEL? 
The increase in violence in the first decade of the twenty-first century between 
transnational organized crime (TOC) and the state security forces in various regions of 
México was widely viewed as a challenge to security and stability, particularly during the 
presidency of Felipe Calderón (December 1, 2006–November 30, 2012). Some observers 
have drawn comparisons between the contemporary struggle with organized crime 
syndicates in México and the well documented conflict in Colombia in the 1980s and 
1990s between the Colombian government and Pablo Escobar (the head of the Medellín 
cartel) and latterly the Cali cartel. Escobar (born on December 1, 1949) was killed by 
Colombian law enforcement on December 2, 1993 and by the end of the 1990s, both 
cartels had been eliminated. The strengthening and professionalization of the Policía 
Nacional de Colombia (Colombian National Police—CNP) in this period is viewed as a 
possible model for improving the capability and effectiveness of law enforcement 
elsewhere. Specifically, some observers find relevance in the Colombian model (from the 
1980s and 1990s) to the improvement of security and stability in México in the twenty-
first century. This study addresses the question: Can key attributes of the Colombian law 
enforcement model of the 1980s and 1990s be identified and applied to México’s 
contemporary struggle against organized crime? 
A. BACKGROUND 
The Colombian government spent over a decade combatting two potent drug 
trafficking cartels. By 1980, profoundly high levels of violence had polarized Colombian 
society.1 The Medellín cartel, responsible for roughly 80 percent of cocaine in the United 
States, established death squads that targeted anyone associated with its competition, 
including political leaders, security officials, unionists, and intellectuals.2 Meanwhile, the 
political system was saturated with corruption, so much so that even Pablo Escobar was 
                                                 
1 Scott B. MacDonald, Mountain High, White Avalanche: Cocaine and Power in the Andean States 
and Panama (New York: The Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1989), 17. 
2 Ibid., 23. 
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elected as a congressional representative in 1982.3 Although security forces maintained a 
tactical advantage in composition and kinetic capability, they were strategically 
ineffective in containing the growth in power and influence of the Medellín and Cali 
cartels throughout the country. 
Nevertheless, power shifted back in the government’s direction after years of 
reform in law enforcement strategy down to the mid-1990s. A close partnership with the 
U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) and the U.S. Special Operations Command 
(SOCOM) assisted in more effective Colombian operations to disrupt narco-activities.4 A 
decade later, México experienced a spike in violence during the presidency of Felipe 
Calderón similar to Colombia in the 1980s and early 1990s.  
Since Calderón’s initiative began in December 2006, tens of thousands of people 
were killed in violence associated with organized crime throughout the country.5 At a 
general level, the Mexican struggle resembles the Colombian problem in various ways, 
including intimidation and bribery, extensive corruption at municipal, state, and federal 
levels of authority, ineffective local law enforcement, the deployment of federal military 
forces to combat drug cartels, and genuine national security concerns from both the U.S. 
and Mexican governments.6 
B. PURPOSE AND SCOPE 
While some suggest that Colombia developed a successful and exportable 
approach to defeating organized criminal activity, others suggest that Colombia’s model 
was simply an appropriate fit for the specific context in which it operated. The purpose of 
my research is to understand the Colombian cartels of the late twentieth century as well 
as the history and contemporary dynamics of the criminal organizations in México, in 
order to determine the applicability of Colombia’s law enforcement model of the 1980s 
and 1990s to México’s current struggle.  
                                                 
3 MacDonald, Mountain High, White Avalanche, 25. 
4 Ibid., 162. 
5 Sylvia Longmire, Cartel: The Coming Invasion of México’s Drug Wars (New York: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2011), 8. 
6 Ibid., 10. 
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In relation to Colombia, I focus on the rise of the Medellín and Cali cartels 
beginning in the early 1980s, and I conclude with Pablo Escobar’s death in late 1993 
(which precipitated the effective elimination of the Medellín organization) and the 
subsequent demise of the Cali cartel in the mid-1990s. For México, I focus on the period 
beginning with President Calderón’s offensive against existing criminal organizations 
starting in December 2006 to the present-day struggles against Mexican-based 
transnational organized crime syndicates. While my research includes activities of all the 
major cartels operating in México, it focuses on three particular criminal organizations: 
the Sinaloa cartel, Los Zetas, and Los Caballeros Templarios (Knights Templar). I also 
examine the strategy pursued by Mexican security forces and the supporting role by 
international partners. Against the background of the ongoing debate about law 
enforcement in both Colombia and México, I end by drawing some conclusions about the 
relevance of Colombia’s law enforcement model to contemporary México. 
C. METHODOLOGY 
To assess the applicability of Colombia’s law enforcement model to México’s 
current struggle, I apply detailed case studies of drug trafficking organizations in 
Colombia during the 1980s and 1990s and organized crime in México from 2006 to the 
present day. In both cases, I use a revised version of Leites and Wolf’s input-output 
model.7 This model involves exogenous and endogenous inputs that produce outputs that 
directly impact authorities and the sustainment of future criminal activity. Second, I focus 
on the law enforcement strategy and associated external support, particularly as it 
succeeded in Colombia’s defeat of large cartel enterprises. I take a similar approach to 
México and incorporate results from the Colombian case study to identify elements that 
appropriately fit with México’s struggle. 
D. LITERATURE REVIEW 
My research includes the use of various works that explain the history and 
dynamics of drug trafficking and organized crime in Colombia. Belen Boville provides a 
                                                 
7 Nathan Leites and Charles Wolf, Rebellion and Authority: An Analytic Essay on Insurgent Conflicts 
(Chicago: Markham Publishing Company, 1970), 32–35. 
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history of cocaine development and distribution in her 2004 The Cocaine War in Context: 
Drugs and Politics. Boville begins with the origin of drug policies in the United States 
and the associated development of organized criminal activity.8 Overall, she provides a 
look at U.S.-Colombian cooperation, which can in turn be used to link Colombia to the 
current challenges in México. 
Similar to Boville, Scott MacDonald delivered an analysis of the cocaine industry 
in the Andean region from the 1970s through the 1980s in his 1989 Mountain High, 
White Avalanche: Cocaine and Power in the Andean States and Panama. At the time of 
this publication, the U.S. was just beginning efforts towards an anti-drug campaign. He 
provided relevant policy options for the United States in the war on drugs as the world 
entered the final decade of the twentieth century, including a focus on domestic demand 
as well as external supply. Specifically, MacDonald suggested the introduction of drug 
education programs, stricter penalties on drug distribution, and greater regulation on 
chemical exports.9 He warned that U.S. policy must place greater priority on the Andean 
states or face dire consequences; a warning that most would agree was heeded by 
policymakers in the following decade.10 Some argue that similar warnings apply to U.S. 
policy towards México today. 
While MacDonald’s publication provides an understanding of the Colombian 
power struggle in the 1980s, Mark Bowden’s 2001 Killing Pablo, examines the rise and 
fall of Pablo Escobar and the Medellín cartel, concluding with his death in late 1993 and 
its subsequent impact on security and stability in Colombia.11 Bowden’s account of the 
Medellín cartel provides the detail necessary to understand the cartel’s extraordinary rise 
to power. Furthermore, his description of the cartel’s demise illuminates the changes in 
law enforcement strategy in Colombia by the early 1990s.12 
                                                 
8 Belen Boville, The Cocaine War in Context: Drugs and Politics (New York: Algora Publishing, 
2004), 25. 
9 MacDonald, Mountain High, White Avalanche, 120, 122. 
10 Ibid., 136. 
11 Mark Bowden, Killing Pablo: The Hunt for the World’s Greatest Outlaw (New York: Viking 
Penguin, 2001), 15. 
12 Ibid., 260. 
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Ron Chepesiuk’s 2003 The Bullet or the Bribe: Taking Down Colombia’s Cali 
Drug Cartel, details the organizational depth that allowed the Cali cartel to grow in 
power and influence. By the early 1990s, the Cali cartel appeared to be an enduring 
organization with global reach, while the Medellín cartel had lost favor with its 
supporters and increasingly struggled to exist. The demise of the Medellín cartel 
eventually allowed U.S. and Colombian officials to focus efforts against the Cali cartel. 
In 1994, General Rosso Jose Serrano was appointed Chief of the Colombian National 
Police (CNP). Serrano immediately addressed the corruption, unprofessionalism, and ill-
training of the CNP to form a more effective security organization. Chepesiuk explains 
that although far from perfect, Serrano’s efforts produced a capable CNP that worked 
closely with U.S. organizations. Ultimately, the Cali cartel was defeated after the arrest 
and conviction of its leaders in the mid-1990s.13 Chepesiuk concludes that a large 
signature in organized crime ultimately increases vulnerability to targeting and can 
eventually lead to defeat.14 This resulted in the modern-day, Colombian-based cartelitos, 
or small drug organizations, and the international power vacuum that has been filled by 
often much larger Mexican-based cartels.15  
In the case of México, Sylvia Longmire’s 2011 Cartel: The Coming Invasion of 
México’s Drug Wars, describes cartel operations and their impact on both the United 
States and México. Longmire examines now ex-President Felipe Calderón’s aggressive 
policy against organized crime, and presents a number of suggestions in engaging 
México’s security issues.16 First, she argues that while the cartels are widely labeled as 
an aggressive form of organized crime, that label does not fit an enemy who clearly 
engages in terrorist and insurgent-like violence.17 Second, Longmire proposes various 
strategic priorities in defeating the cartels. She suggests that Mexican forces target 
monetary profits in addition to military strikes on narco-safe havens and attempts to 
                                                 
13 Ron Chepesiuk, The Bullet or the Bribe (Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 2003), 118, 200–201. 
14 Ibid., 256. 
15 Ibid., 258. 
16 Longmire, Cartel, 113. 
17 Ibid., 175–177. 
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purge corruption at all levels of government and law enforcement.18 Longmire also 
explains that U.S. policy should focus on border security19 consider the legalization of 
various narcotics, and enforce stricter federal gun laws.20 While Longmire provides 
general suggestions for U.S. involvement, there is little detail or specifics as to how the 
U.S. should implement her policy suggestions. 
Complementing Longmire’s view, Ioan Grillo’s 2011 El Narco: Inside México’s 
Criminal Insurgency, describes México’s narco-industry as a diversified and dangerous 
movement that threatens security within the country’s borders. He argues that México’s 
criminal organizations resemble an insurgency more so than a mere band of criminals, 
citing the way in which they organize personnel, the presence of dedicated paramilitary 
wings, and insurgent-style attacks that have left certain regions of México in disarray.21 
In considerations for a way ahead in México’s struggle against organized crime, Grillo 
cites past efforts against Colombian cartels, including the use of informants and a kingpin 
strategy that targets cartel leaders, as a current strategy of Mexican security forces. While 
he suggests that informant networks are essential in combatting the cartels, he questions 
the effectiveness of arresting or killing criminal leadership.22 Grillo cautions that the 
cartels’ expansion into Central American countries and their diversified set of criminal 
activity outside of drug trafficking is cause for alarm, suggesting the possibility of a 
broader civil war that could engulf the entire country.23 To avoid such consequences, 
Grillo’s final chapter offers a strategy for peace. Despite recognizing the diversified 
character of criminal organizations in México, he suggests that drug legalization is at the 
                                                 
18 Ibid., 181–182. 
19 Ibid., 198. 
20 Ibid., 199. 
21 Ioan Grillo, El Narco: Inside México’s Criminal Insurgency (New York: Bloomsbury Press, 2011), 
211, 213, 217. 
22 Ibid., 226, 239. 
23 Ibid., 273. 
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core of reducing organized crime.24 Additionally, he touches on México’s needs to 
address military desertions, police reform, and social programs for the local populace.25 
No study of Mexican-based organized crime is complete without the detailed 
studies on the topic by George W. Grayson. His latest is 2014 The Cartels: The Story of 
Mexico’s Most Dangerous Criminal Organizations and Their Impact on U.S. Security, 
which chronicles the violence associated with organized crime in México and emphasizes 
the challenges faced in the provision of U.S. support. Amongst his many publications on 
México’s contemporary struggles, I particularly drew from his 2010 La Familia Drug 
Cartel: Implications for U.S-Mexican Security to examine the dynamics of organized 
crime in the volatile state of Michoacán. Grayson suggests numerous steps to curb the 
influence of organized crime, to include a focus on informants and intelligence gathering, 
increased multi-national support, and cooperation with the Mexican community living in 
United States.26 His proposals provide a balanced approach to policy and strategy against 
organized crime, and if implemented, could have positive effects on security and stability 
within México. 
In addition to the literature listed above, I used a number of journal articles that 
took different perspectives on Colombia and México. I also paid close attention to media 
coverage on the ongoing struggle in México, as the environment under a new presidential 
administration continues to rapidly evolve. Additionally, I acquired non-attributable 
information from various sources. My research confirmed that anonymity is crucial to the 
safety of individuals, and necessary in obtaining insightful observations. 
E. CHAPTER REVIEW AND HYPOTHESIS 
The remainder of this thesis is divided into five chapters. In Chapter II, I describe 
the Medellín and Cali cartels in terms of inputs, conversion mechanisms, and outputs 
involved in their operations. I illuminate endogenous and exogenous inputs in the form of 
                                                 
24 Ibid., 276. 
25 Ibid., 286–288. 
26 George W. Grayson, La Familia Drug Cartel: Implications for U.S.-Mexican Security (Carlisle 
Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2010), 78–83. 
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coercion, persuasion, recruitment, and external support. Furthermore, I explain various 
mechanisms the Colombian cartels used to generate profitable organizations that survived 
more than a decade of government pursuit. Finally, I describe the outputs in violence and 
their corresponding effects on authority. Chapter III evaluates the Colombian law 
enforcement response, which is widely credited with defeating both large cartel 
syndicates and reducing violence in Colombia to manageable levels. I identify cartel 
activity that exceeded the government’s threshold for violence and resulted in a dedicated 
effort to defeat the cartels through strategic shifts, law enforcement reform, external 
support from the United States, and integration with the local populace. 
Chapter IV shifts focus to México, concentrating on the contemporary struggle as 
it has evolved since ex-President Felipe Calderón initiated his offensive against organized 
crime syndicates in December 2006. Similar to Chapter II, I describe cartel activity in 
México as a system of inputs and outputs in order to allow a comparison of these 
contemporary criminal organizations to their Colombian predecessors. Chapter V draws 
from the previous chapters to identify the similarities and differences between Colombian 
drug trafficking organizations of the 1980s and 1990s and contemporary criminal 
organizations in México. I then evaluate the Colombian law enforcement model as it 
applies to the present-day struggle in México. The research suggests that although the 
Colombian model would have a minimal effect on drug production and transportation, a 
hybrid version of the Colombian model can effectively target large-scale criminal 
organizations, reduce violence to manageable levels, and restore order in affected regions 
of México. Chapter VI summarizes the previous chapters and acknowledges specific 
areas of research outside the scope of this thesis but contribute to the overall study of law 
enforcement and the struggle against organized crime in México. Overall, I argue that a 
hybrid version of the Colombian model can be generalized and applied to México’s 
current internal security challenges. To this end, the next chapter looks at Colombia and 
evaluates the structure, particularly in terms of inputs and outputs, of the Medellín and 
Cali cartels during the 1980s and 1990s. 
 
 9 
II. COLOMBIA: THE AGE OF CARTEL CONTROL 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The Colombian state has long been a hotbed of violence and political struggle. 
One of the most violent and threatening periods of recent Colombian history was the rise 
and fall of the Medellín and Cali drug cartels. In the late 1970s, the increased popularity 
of cocaine in the United States facilitated the cartels’ rapid rise in power, wealth, and 
influence.27 A decade later, the cartels had grown into multi-billion dollar, transnational 
criminal organizations with unprecedented control within Colombian borders and 
beyond. Their violent reach attracted international attention and by 1990, the media had 
crowned the cartel “godfathers” as the most feared terrorists in the world.28 This chapter 
explains the cartels’ operations as part of an overall system of inputs and outputs. The 
efficiency of these particular systems resulted in two powerful criminal organizations that 
afflicted Colombia and the greater international environment for almost two decades.  
B. CARTEL BACKGROUND 
The Medellín cartel was founded by six Colombian men, but most notably it was 
controlled by the notorious drug lord, Pablo Escobar Gaviria. The founding members all 
came from lower-income upbringings with early backgrounds as street criminals. From 
the beginning, it established a fierce reputation through use of intimidation and violence 
to achieve its goals.29 The Cali cartel was founded by Gilberto and Miguel Rodríguez-
Orejuela as well as José Santacruz Londoño. Contrary to the Medellín cartel, these men 
pursued a “low-profile” strategy and the reputation of a less violent and less threatening, 
criminal enterprise. By the 1990s, its strategy proved successful as it was recognized as 
Colombia’s most powerful drug trafficking syndicate.30 Theses cartels did not reach such  
 
                                                 
27 Chepesiuk, The Bullet or the Bribe, 18. 
28 Bowden, Killing Pablo, 15. 
29 Chepesiuk, The Bullet or the Bribe, 61. 
30 Ibid., 21. 
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heights in power and influence by chance. To do so, they established a deliberate system 
of inputs to build their organizations, and outputs or products to reach unprecedented 
levels of power and influence in Colombia.  
C. THE CARTEL SYSTEM 
As the cartels expanded, they adopted many of the same organizational 
characteristics of legitimate corporations. Just as large corporations, each cartel managed 
a system of inputs that it converted into desired outputs. In the cartels’ case, the outputs 
came in the form of drugs and violence. To understand how the cartels made this system 
work, I separate the components of the system and analyze the various inputs, conversion 
mechanisms, and outputs that led to their rise in power. I start with an analysis of 
endogenous inputs that set the necessary conditions for sustained operations of the 
system. These inputs, or contributions, provide the cartels a foundation to develop and 
expand their illegal activities, contributing to their influence on Colombian society.31 
1. Endogenous Inputs 
a. Coercion 
First, I examine endogenous inputs in the form of coercive activity, which 
includes kidnapping and murder, illegal tax collection, and destruction of property.32 
These efforts aim to intimidate those who could potentially interfere with cartel 
operations. 
(1) Kidnapping, Assassination, Torture. The first form of endogenous 
contribution is identified as coercive activity that garners complicity with a group’s 
intentions.33 Both the Cali and Medellín cartels used coercive tactics early and often as a 
means of intimidation. In the evolution of their criminal activity, the cartels discovered 
kidnapping to be both a coercive and income generating tool. The founders of the Cali 
                                                 
31 Leites and Wolf, Rebellion and Authority, 32. 
32 Ibid. 
33 Ibid., 33. 
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cartel originally joined a group called Las Chemas, a kidnapping organization, and used 
ransoms to bankroll their entry into the business of drug trafficking.34  
In another form of coercion, the Cali godfathers often found it more efficient to 
eliminate a threat or adversary than simply to intimidate them into submission. Murder 
not only eliminated the problem, but provided a deterrent against the possibility of future 
threats. Unlike their competition in Medellín, the Cali godfathers’ generally avoided 
targeting government officials. This did not make their activities any less barbaric. On 
one occasion, Miguel Rodríguez-Orejuela had a fellow drug trafficker murdered simply 
because Rodríguez-Orejuela coveted the man’s wife.35 Additionally, the Cali cartel 
employed the Palestinos, a group of Colombian hit men who performed deliberately 
ordered executions in Colombia as well as New York, Chicago, and Miami.36 The 
cartel’s coercive capabilities, although not as overt as its rival, the Medellín cartel, 
undoubtedly contributed to its distinction in the 1980s and 1990s as a dangerous 
organization.  
Meanwhile, the Medellín cartel emerged as arguably the most dangerous criminal 
organization in Colombian history. While Pablo Escobar used kidnapping to coerce his 
opponents, he preferred a policy of plata o plomo (silver or lead). His method was to 
bribe politicians, judges, or law enforcement, and if they did not accept the bribe (plata), 
they faced death (plomo).37 Furthermore, Escobar and the Medellín cartel did not hesitate 
to eliminate those who interfered with their narco-activities, regardless of the targets’ 
positions in Colombian society. The Medellín cartel was widely considered responsible 
for a number of high profile murders. In 1984, Escobar ordered the assassination of 
Colombian justice minister, Rodrigo Lara, for openly attacking Escobar’s reputation.38 In 
1989, he ordered the assassination of Luis Carlos Galan, a front-running presidential 
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candidate. Three months later, Escobar failed to assassinate Galan’s successor, Cesar 
Gaviria, when he ordered the bombing of a commercial flight from Bogotá to Medellín.39 
(2) Forcible Tax Collection. In the criminal world, tax collection typically 
comes in the form of extortion in exchange for protection or simply to keep the criminal 
organization from interfering with a legitimate individual or business’s affairs. There is 
not much evidence to suggest that cartels in Colombia engaged in any noteworthy 
extortion activities. More than likely, the sheer volume of monetary profit involved in the 
drug trade made it unnecessary to extort the local populace. Furthermore, the cartels 
maintained a significant level of support from locals within their home “turf.” Any 
extortion efforts would have likely weakened that support and detracted from a robust 
system of early warning against competitors and state efforts against the cartels. 
(3) Destruction/Confiscation of Property. Similar to extortion, destruction and 
confiscation of property would have been activities detrimental to the cartels’ drug 
operations. Other than attacks against each other and state organizations (which I discuss 
later in this chapter), the cartels avoided destructive efforts against their supporters. 
b. Persuasion 
A second form of endogenous inputs comes from persuasive activities that seek to 
achieve the same desired effect as coercion, such as the gaining of active or passive 
complicity with a cartel’s operations. According to Leites and Wolf, persuasion comes in 
multiple forms, including an identifiable ideology, discrediting authority, and various 
forms of payments.40 The cartels pursued a combination of these to garner the necessary 
connivance of law enforcement, politicians, and the local populace. 
(1) Ideological Persuasion. Despite the benefits of ideological persuasion, it 
was largely absent from Colombian cartel operations. Their goal was to grow in wealth 
and power rather than fight for a cause, thus ideological persuasion of those under their 
control was not a necessary component. Persuasive efforts against the state, however, 
were important in the cartels’ campaign to appear as legitimate enterprises. 
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(2) Discrediting of Established Authority. Both cartels dedicated a 
considerable amount of time, albeit through different strategies, to discredit the 
Colombian government. The Cali cartel, which sought a low-profile, consistently rejected 
any and all government accusations that the organization was a criminal operation. The 
godfathers of Cali maintained that they were nothing more than successful entrepreneurs. 
In a 1991 interview, Gilberto Rodríguez-Orejuela emphasized his claim as a legitimate 
and successful businessman. He coyly explained that his only crime was success.41  
The Medellín cartel, however, used a much more direct approach in attempts to 
garner popular support and discredit the actions of the Colombian authorities. Pablo 
Escobar was a master manipulator of public opinion who became infamous for his formal 
letters to political and law enforcement leaders, including the U.S. Ambassador to 
Colombia. Recurring themes in his letters included accusations of terrorist actions 
committed by a puppet government, run by the United States.42 According to Escobar, all 
actions of the state were taken against his “struggle” (a struggle he shared with the 
common man) to earn an honest living.43 His efforts to delegitimize the government 
transcended his death, and he was mourned by thousands of rioting Colombians in 
Medellín.44 Discrediting the government was key to his strategy, however words alone 
did not suffice. Rewards for support were a necessary part of success in the business of 
drug trafficking. 
(3) Payments (Rewards). Colombian cartels frequently used bribery in 
persuading individuals to turn a blind eye to illegal activities. Unlike the violence of the 
Medellín cartel, the men from Cali believed they should buy Colombia rather than 
terrorize it.45 Jorge Salcedo, a former member of the Cali cartel, explains that corruption 
is necessary to the growth and maintenance of cartel operations.46 Salcedo continues that 
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“hundreds of high-ranking and lower-level police were on the [Cali] cartel’s secret 
payroll….From helicopter pilots to Generals.”47 In 1989, a DEA report estimated that the 
Cali cartel bribed low-level CNP officers with $1,550 per week, captains received $5,000 
per week, and generals received $15,000 per week.48 In addition to law enforcement, 
Salcedo describes the numerous judges and politicians who sold themselves to organized 
crime.49 The Rodríguez-Orejuela brothers used their legitimate business holdings, 
including Banco de Trabajadores (Worker’s Bank) and media outlets to secure 
relationships with key politicians and media personalities.50 Bribery efforts were largely 
successful and made it nearly impossible to penetrate the Cali cartel. 
Additionally, the Medellín cartel regularly offered bribes to law enforcement and 
politicians to gain information on pending operations against the cartel’s leaders. 
Following the 1989 assassination of presidential candidate Luis Galan, the Colombian 
National Police organized an aggressive Search Bloc to bring the Medellín leaders to 
justice.51 Colombian Colonel Hugo Martinez, commander of the task force, was offered 
$6 million by Escobar through a retired police officer to ensure the Search Bloc was 
unsuccessful.52 While the Colonel did not accept the bribe, it symbolized the resources 
Escobar and the cartel leaders could mobilize against their “enemies.” The multi-billion 
dollar drug industry afforded both cartels the ability to bribe law enforcement, political, 
and judicial leaders into compliance, an important advantage that would take years of 
concerted efforts to overcome. 
c. Recruits  
One of the most important endogenous inputs of the Colombian cartels was the 
ability to recruit individuals to expand the footprint of drug operations. In their 
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recruitment strategy, cartels once again resorted to plata o plomo, silver or lead.53 The 
silver represented attempts to recruit politicians, judges, and law enforcement personnel 
to their payroll. The Cali cartel placed a greater emphasis on plata, and its ability to 
“buy” individuals that were necessary to conduct operations; “spread the money around, 
and everyone accepts you.”54 If plata was not sufficient, cartels recruited sicarios (paid 
hit men) to conduct kidnappings and executions of rival cartel members and political/law 
enforcement personnel who interfered with its business. The Medellín cartel relied on this 
latter strategy much more than the men from Cali.55 
Additionally, cartels maintained a robust early warning system through the vast 
recruitment of passive support from the local populace, particularly within their 
respective home turfs of Cali and Medellín. In exchange for the many local business and 
job opportunities created by the cartels, locals provided the information advantage 
necessary to stay ahead of law enforcement activities.  
d. Information 
Any information benefit gained by the cartels was largely unavailable to 
Colombian law enforcement. This lack of cooperation from the local populace made it 
quite difficult for Colombian law enforcement and supporting U.S. organizations to 
effectively target the cartels. Jerry Salameh, a DEA agent assigned to investigate the Cali 
cartel in the 1990s, explained that citizens of Cali would “look the other way, as the 
godfathers curried favor by spreading their wealth around town.”56 Even the local police 
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example, the Cali cartel provided financial assistance to upgrade police posts around the 
city. In return, local law enforcement facilitated a “process of accommodation” that 
ensured no interference with cartel operations.57 
In Medellín, the cartel managed an information advantage despite the challenges 
during an open war against the Colombian state. On one hand, the people of Medellín 
adored Pablo Escobar, and sought to inform him of any state activity against the cartel. 
Law enforcement, however, posed a slight challenge in gathering information. Bribery 
and staunch intimidation efforts, plata o plomo, successfully prompted complicity and 
information on any planned state action. An information advantage was key to the 
longevity of cartel operations. While they maximized efforts to self-sustain their 
respective organizations, there was a finite level of internal resources that could support 
the international expansion of cocaine distribution. This resulted in a necessary level of 
exogenous support to maintain the cartels within Colombia, while permitting a 
maturation into a global enterprise. 
2. Exogenous Inputs 
a. Publicity 
An essential element in gaining support for drug trafficking operations was a 
robust information operation (IO) campaign emphasizing the cartels’ benign nature. In 
Colombia, there was a significant difference in the type and size of publicity efforts 
between the Cali and Medellín cartels. The Cali cartel sought a low profile from its early 
stages, attempting to focus publicity on its legitimate business enterprises as the source of 
its wealth. Miguel Rodríguez-Orejuela eventually put most of his efforts towards the 
cartel’s interests in real estate and a professional soccer team. The Cali cartel touted its 
legitimate character in Colombian courts, and through an unofficial alliance with the state 
against the Medellín cartel, claimed its only fear as upstanding citizens was the threat of 
attack from the Medellín cartel.58 
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Pablo Escobar, on the other hand, was quite content to shine in the public 
spotlight. Throughout his battle with authorities, Escobar submitted public letters 
addressed to senior leaders within the Colombian government.59 Concerned with his 
image, Pablo’s publicity efforts ultimately allowed the state to keep a pulse on his 
whereabouts, activities, and planned operations. 
Both cartels advertised their message through Colombian media outlets, who kept 
continuous coverage of the war against the cartels throughout the 1980s-1990s. The 
cartels secured various media personalities on their respective payrolls to ensure a 
positive spin on news about their activities. The Cali cartel founded the Grupo Radial 
Colombia, an association of local radio stations, as one of its legitimate business 
endeavors.60 This benefited the cartel as a publicity outlet from which it could ensure 
positive press concerning its activities. Media outreach was only one form of necessary 
external support to the cartels. As production and distribution of cocaine expanded across 
the globe, other forms of external support became necessary. 
b. Material 
The most notable form of material support came in the form of transportation and 
production hubs provided by international supporters. This obviously came at a steep 
financial price to the cartels. Compared to the growth in profit, however, it was a 
relatively small price to pay. A notorious example of material support was found in 
Nicaragua, where the Marxist Sandinista regime provided a secure air transportation hub 
for Medellín drug shipments.61 External support served as a profound enabler in the 
expansion of transnational drug trafficking. The increased demand for cocaine and the 
subsequent profits afforded the cartels the ability to pay the necessary fees to secure such 
support.  
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3. Conversion Mechanisms 
The system includes various mechanisms that convert inputs into outputs. These 
include organization of personnel, financing, logistics, intelligence, and means of 
communication as essential functions to permit outputs of violence and intimidation in 
organized crime.62 
a. Personnel Organization 
In their early stages, both the Medellín and Cali cartels pursued a hub and spoke 
personnel network model, which internalized and centralized all stages of production and 
distribution of cocaine.63 This allowed the leadership to maintain tight control over 
operations. As the cocaine business grew into a multinational enterprise, the Cali cartel 
adjusted the conduct of personnel interaction. The cartel recognized that a more 
compartmentalized strategy provided the necessary protection of operations if one cell 
was compromised. In addition, transit and storage was pushed out to neighboring Latin 
American countries. While the business became geographically decentralized, the central 
operational control maintained by the Cali cartel “executives” remained constant.64 A 
DEA administrator, Thomas Constantine, explained that cartel leadership “control[led] 
every aspect of the cocaine trade, from the amount of cocaine to be shipped on 
consignment, right down to the markings on each package.”65 The Medellín cartel, 
however, never operated under the same compartmentalization. Drug trafficking, 
violence, and overt competition with the state were carried out by a hierarchical system.66 
While personnel organization and employment varied between the cartels, the flow of 
money was relatively similar. 
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b. Financing 
The cocaine trade was a self-financing endeavor. Production and distribution was 
the single most profitable arm of cartel operations. In order to mask the mass profits of 
illegal drug operations, the cartels pursued an international money laundering scheme. 
Harold Wankel, former DEA agent, explained to Congress that without drug money, the 
traffickers could not finance any phase of their illegal trade. This included manufacturing, 
transportation, smuggling, and distribution—and even murder and bribery. Wankel 
continued that “drug money laundering organizations are essential to the cash flow” of 
cartel operations.67 
Money laundering activities continuously evolved to evade the pursuit of U.S. and 
Colombian law enforcement. In 1985, the Cali cartel developed a complex scheme 
through the use of front companies who would push money through the Colombian 
National Bank in Miami. Another widely used conversion mechanism for illegal drug 
profits was the Colombian black market.68 As a common form of commerce in the 
country, the black market easily converted illegal profits into legitimate currency. As 
business expanded, so did the marketplace for money laundering activities. By 1992, 
money laundering had expanded in the U.S., Panama, Costa Rica, Italy, Spain, 
Luxembourg, and a number of other European countries.69 Parallel to the vast production 
of cocaine and corresponding cash profit, it was essential to maintain a deliberate 
logistics plan that protected the transfer of drugs and money across international borders.  
c. Logistics 
Transportation of cocaine was a constant game of cat and mouse, as the cartels 
made every effort to elude authorities and ensure the successful delivery of their illegal 
product. Both cartels used a variety of sophisticated drug smuggling techniques. Initially, 
the cartels focused on maritime transportation routes through the Caribbean to transfer 
cocaine. Concealment methods included false bottoms in legitimately containerized bulk 
                                                 
67 Chepesiuk, The Bullet and the Bribe, 93. 
68 Ibid., 96. 
69 Chepesiuk, The Bullet and the Bribe, 100–101, 103. 
 20 
maritime cargo.70 Most routes headed towards Miami, the early hub of cocaine 
distribution into the United States. The Cali cartel concealed the bulk of cocaine inside 
containers and odd compartments aboard large cargo ships, making it difficult for law 
enforcement to interdict.71 The Medellín cartel preferred bulk cocaine shipments to be 
quickly dropped at airstrips or even off loaded mid-flight into water sources, and 
retrieved by high-speed motor boats.72 
By the end of the 1980s, U.S. interdiction efforts in the Caribbean forced the 
cartels to move the bulk of their transportation efforts to ground routes through México. 
The shift to México tapped into an already established web of rat lines that trafficked 
illegal immigrants and marijuana into the United States. By the early 1990s, roughly 80 
percent of Colombian cocaine entered the United States through México.73 Traffickers 
used all assets available, including private planes, trucks, and cars to cross the U.S.-
Mexican border.74 The constant challenges in logistics made the ability to gather accurate 
intelligence an essential component of cartel activities. 
d. Intelligence 
As already noted, the information advantage secured by the cartels was quite 
possibly the most important asset in their illicit operations. Intelligence efforts through 
bribery and intimidation of political leaders, judges, law enforcement, and the local 
populace successfully produced a robust early warning system. Cartels therefore knew of 
any attempts to attack the network well before the execution of such actions. Parallel to 
this increased reliance on accurate intelligence, the cartels exhausted their efforts to 
ensure the concealment of ‘business’ communications.  
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e. Communications 
As the cartels grew in geographical space, so did the reliance on alternative 
methods to face-to-face communication. Coded telephone calls, faxes, and radio 
communications became the common methods of cartel communications.75 Similarly, 
law enforcement technology allowed for communication intercepts, which required 
constant adjustment for the cartels to maintain their operational security. Once they 
discovered the capacity for law enforcement to monitor home and business phones, cartel 
members began to rely on pay phones. As law enforcement began tapping those as well, 
the cartels turned to faxes, then cell phones.76 The ability to maintain discreet 
communication was crucial to all illicit operations. This complex system of trafficking 
efforts was widely successful. As a direct result, the cartels maintained the power and 
ability to plan and execute activities that protected their interests and expanded their 
operations. Next, I examine these activities as system outputs, or products, of the cartels. 
4. Outputs 
Aside from the massive monetary profits associated with the drug trade, there is a 
well-documented association with violent behavior. Many agree that the profits at stake 
are a direct cause for competition and violence amongst rivals in organized crime. Within 
the system, I evaluate outputs in terms of sabotage, violence against individuals, and 
small scale attacks aimed at law enforcement as well as rival cartels. 
a. Sabotage 
Although violence became a staple of the Colombian cartels, deliberate acts of 
sabotage were largely absent from their activities. The U.S. Department of Defense 
defines sabotage as “an act or acts with intent to injure, interfere with, or obstruct the 
national defense of a country….”77 While the Medellín cartel committed acts directly  
 
                                                 
75 Drug Enforcement Agency, The Cali Cartel: The New Kings of Cocaine. 
76 Chepesiuk, The Bullet and the Bribe, 82. 
77 Department of Defense, Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms (Joint Publication 1-02) 
(Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 2013), 231. 
 22 
aimed at the state, its objective was not to obstruct the national defense of Colombia, but 
rather to safeguard its illegal interests. This does not discount the extreme spike in 
violence at the height of cartel power in Colombia. 
b. Violence Against Individuals 
Violent acts against individuals were synonymous with the dangers involved in 
Colombian drug trafficking. While the Medellín cartel built a reputation as the more 
violent of the two major cartels, neither hesitated to resort to violent acts against 
competitors, politically appointed officials, or law enforcement if they deemed it 
necessary. One can argue that the ability to gather the information necessary to execute 
violent acts against individuals was only attainable through the profits gained from the 
drug trade itself. 
From petty disputes and inter-cartel competition to high profile assassinations, 
both cartels accepted violence as necessary. Pablo Escobar and the Medellín cartel 
resorted to violent acts against any individual that stood in the way of “business” 
operations. Low-level criminals, state judges, even presidential candidates were not 
exempt from targeting and assassination.78 The cartel relied on sicarios to carry out any 
act of violence against individuals. Correspondingly, the multi-billion dollar industry of 
drug trafficking allowed cartel leaders to pursue the most sensitive of targets; price and 
payment were not an issue.79 
The Cali cartel acted in violence as a mode of last resort against state officials, but 
viewed violence as a mode of convenience when it involved the targeting of rival cartel 
members. In the early 1990s, the Cali cartel was accused of supporting Los Pepes 
(Perseguidos por Pablo Escobar—People Persecuted by Pablo Escobar), a group that 
vowed to retaliate against any of Escobar’s attacks that injured innocent people.80 
Reports indicated that Los Pepes’ deliberate targeting of Medellín cartel members was 
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financially backed by the Cali cartel.81 Without the financial capital provided by the drug 
trade, both cartels would likely have been restricted in their ability to commit violent acts 
against individuals with such frequency.  
c. Small-Scale Attacks 
In addition to the many assassinations, the use of other small scale attacks was a 
violent output almost exclusively reserved by the Medellín cartel. In 1989, at the height 
of his power, Escobar orchestrated the bombing of an Avianca Airliner, resulting in the 
death of 110 people.82 On January 30, 1993, the Medellín cartel bombed a Bogotá 
bookstore with 220 pounds of dynamite.83 Small-scale harassment attacks sought to deter 
law enforcement from pursuing the cartel leader, and offered Escobar a glimmer of hope 
that the Colombian state would come to an agreement with the cartels to end the 
bloodshed. 
While the Cali cartel was not accused of actively participating in small-scale 
attacks, its support for Los Pepes suggested a level of complicity in more than mere 
assassinations. Los Pepes matched Escobar’s bombings with small-scale attacks of its 
own, always aimed at Medellín cartel members or facilities. In retaliation for one of 
Escobar’s car bombings, Los Pepes answered by destroying three fincas (estates) owned 
by the Escobar family.84 Similar to the violence against individuals, the ability for either 
cartel to execute small scale attacks was a product of the wealth and power they obtained 
through drug trafficking operations. These attacks took their toll on the state, as law 
enforcement paid a heavy price in operations to rid Colombia of the violence.  
5. Effects on Authority 
At the height of cartel power and influence in Colombia, law enforcement faced a 
number of challenges in targeting the cartel networks. Two challenges exerted the 
greatest strain on progress by Colombian state security forces and their U.S. counterparts. 
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First was the widespread corruption within Colombian politics and law enforcement 
through bribery and intimidation by the cartels. Next was the vast information advantage 
maintained by the cartels, particularly in their respective headquarters in Cali and 
Medellín. These challenges made it quite difficult for law enforcement to tangibly reduce 
violence and restore order.  
The profits obtained through transnational drug operations allowed cartels to 
operate with virtual impunity for over a decade. Their operations were more or less 
impregnable—an undeniable byproduct of the ability to pay any price to individuals in 
exchange for compliance and a blind eye to illicit activity. Bribery served a number of 
benefits to cartel activities. The bribery of politicians provided the necessary means to 
sway state policy in favor of the cartels. For years, the Colombian government debated 
laws permitting extradition of drug kingpins to the United States; bribery of politicians 
stalled this debate for years.85 Conversely, the bribery of law enforcement and members 
of the local population allowed for early warning of security operations. Subsequently, 
the majority of law enforcement operations aimed at the cartels resulted in the proverbial 
dry hole. This had a frustrating effect on law enforcement efforts and retarded any 
significant progress against the cartels. 
Bribery of officials, coupled with the popularity of cartels in their home towns, 
offered an information advantage that continuously plagued law enforcement efforts. 
Even members of the CNP’s Search Bloc, were not immune to bribery and 
intimidation.86 This vast early warning network provided cartels with the necessary time 
and space to elude law enforcement operations and protect their business interests. 
6. Effects on Future Endogenous Inputs 
The ability to act with impunity had a cyclic benefit for the cartels. Consequent to 
their growth in power and influence was an ability to conduct violence and intimidation 
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with greater effect. In turn, this allowed the cartels to better coerce and persuade 
individuals to comply with their demands. As a result, drug production and trafficking 
activities continued to grow for over a decade. There was, however, a threshold for 
violence within Colombia, and certain actions that exceeded that threshold were 
universally deemed intolerable by the majority of the Colombian populace. 
Understanding the system allowed security forces to identify those segments of the 
system that were most sensitive and vulnerable to attack. 
D. CONCLUSION 
The pursuit of wealth and power through illicit drug trafficking created an 
environment where the cartels resorted to extreme violence and other coercive measures. 
Only after understanding the elements of this system could Colombian security forces 
begin to develop an effective counter-strategy to defeat them. The next chapter analyzes 
the approach taken by Colombian authorities and their U.S. counterparts in attacking this 
system to achieve what was deemed by many at the outset as an almost insurmountable 
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III. COLOMBIA FIGHTS BACK: DEFEATING ORGANIZED 
CRIME 
In Colombia, the 1980s were defined by the burgeoning cocaine industry. It was a 
multi-billion dollar business that grew larger than anyone could have imagined. As 
discussed in the previous chapter, the Medellín and Cali cartels by 1989 had reached 
unprecedented levels of wealth and power. The Colombian government, pressured by the 
United States, adjusted law enforcement strategy in a focused effort to defeat organized 
crime. This chapter examines the combination of efforts that effectively targeted the most 
vital elements of the cartels’ system.  
Four main factors in law enforcement adjustments led to the fall of the Medellín 
cartel, quickly followed by its rivals in Cali. First, there was a shift in government policy, 
particularly with respect to extradition and negotiations with cartel leaders. Second there 
was a reorganization and professionalization of the CNP. Third, security forces accepted 
an increased level of active international support to combat cartel operations, particularly 
in counter-leadership targeting (kingpin strategy) from United States law enforcement 
and military forces. Last was clandestine cooperation with local vigilantes that provided 
the necessary information to target the core of cartel functions, particularly in personnel 
organization. The result was a dramatic reduction in the narco-violence that had plagued 
Colombia for almost two decades.  
A. EXCEEDING THE THRESHOLD: THE DEMISE OF THE MEDELLÍN 
CARTEL 
As the leader of the Medellín cartel, Pablo Escobar annually found himself on 
Forbes Magazine’s list of the world’s billionaires in the late 1980s.87 Despite his 
economic power, his increasingly violent approach towards conflict with the Colombian 
state resulted in a series of high profile attacks that exceeded the government’s threshold 
of tolerance for the cartel’s illicit activities.  
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1. Political Assassinations in Colombia 
As I discussed in the previous chapter, cocaine use throughout the United States 
in the late 1970s provided an enormous financial opportunity for distributers in 
Colombia. The newfound fortunes of Colombian drug lords made for the growth of the 
cocaine industry, and all the problems that came with it. Pablo Escobar’s spectacularly 
successful drug operations alarmed most Colombian politicians, however few had the 
courage to openly stand against his illegal activities. Beginning in 1983, one particular 
thorn in Escobar’s side was the Colombian Minister of Justice, Rodrigo Lara Bonilla. 
Lara made public what most politicians chose to ignore, that Escobar’s wealth and 
political involvement was all sourced by illegal drug activities.88 In April 1984, Escobar 
subsequently ordered Lara’s assassination.89 The murder of the country’s Minister of 
Justice outraged Colombians and unmistakably identified the cartels as a threat to the 
Colombian state. As a result, the government accepted American assistance to combat the 
cartels’ growth.90 Additionally, then-president Belisario Betancur changed his position in 
favor of an extradition treaty with the United States, causing drug lords to flee Colombia 
in search of temporary asylum.91 The Lara assassination was the first high-profile attack 
to prioritize the crackdown against the Medellín cartel. 
As the 1980s continued, so too did drug profits and associated violence. By 1987, 
cartel intimidation efforts proved successful in persuading the Colombian Supreme Court 
to annul the extradition treaty with the United States.92 Nonetheless, Escobar’s actions 
would once again handcuff cartel operations. In 1989, he saw a significant threat in Luis 
Carlos Galan, a popular presidential candidate for the 1990 election. Galan was quite 
outspoken against the cartels and vowed to extradite cartel leaders upon his election as 
president.93 In August of 1989, Escobar’s sicarios assassinated Galan during a campaign 
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speech southwest of the nation’s capital in Bogotá. Later that year, Escobar 
unsuccessfully attempted to kill Galan’s successor, Cesar Gaviria, through the mid-flight 
bombing of an Avianca commercial airplane. While Gaviria was not on board, the attack 
killed 110 passengers, including two Americans.94 In an instant, Escobar became the 
most wanted criminal in Colombia. 
These attacks exceeded any threshold of tolerance or co-existence that the 
Colombian government was willing to accept. Similar to the Lara assassination, then 
President Virgilio Barco Vargas used executive powers to reestablish the extradition 
policy with the United States.95 The killing of two Americans also made Escobar and the 
Medellín cartel legitimate military targets and triggered an active contribution from the 
United States Special Operations community.96 While Escobar responded with several 
years of repeated bombings against government personnel, their families, and facilities, 
his actions resulted in an unwavering pursuit that slowly led to the attrition of his 
defenses and the cartel’s eventual demise. 
2. Colombian Response 
a. Popular Sentiment Towards Escobar and the Medellín Cartel 
At the height of the Medellín cartel’s dominance, the Colombian government 
maintained a relatively ambivalent attitude towards its activity. For many, the fear and 
intimidation exerted by the cartel was met with acceptance. Meanwhile, many people 
viewed Escobar as a modern day Robin Hood.97 Lara’s assassination in 1983, however, 
caused a major divide in popular opinion towards Escobar. The dramatic shift against him 
became even more evident after the 1989 assassination of Luis Galan. Escobar went from  
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controversial figure to public enemy number one.98 This provided the necessary popular 
support for an aggressive law enforcement strategy to end the war with the Medellín 
cartel.  
b. Government Policy: Extradition as a Bargaining Chip
The Colombian government knew that personnel within the cartel “system” were 
clearly organized through a centralized chain of command. While drugs and money 
travelled through a globally compartmentalized structure, all final approvals were made 
at the top.99 Extradition was a frequent bargaining chip, as cartel leaders commonly 
preferred death in Colombia to imprisonment in the United States.100 While the 1989 
Avianca airline attack triggered then President Barco to reinstate the extradition treaty 
with the United States, his ambitions were short lived. The subsequent violence proved to 
be more than the government was willing to accept. As the Gaviria administration took 
office in 1990, the newly elected president issued a series of decrees that once again 
removed the possibility of extradition and reduced prison terms for cartel members who 
turned themselves in.101 This provided another window of opportunity to reach a 
settlement with cartel leaders through diplomatic means. 
By February 1991, a number of cartel members, including two of the four 
founding members of the Medellín cartel, accepted the government’s offer rather than 
continue a war against the state.102 Although Gaviria’s concessions led to the surrender 
of several important members of the cartel, he couldn’t persuade Escobar to turn himself 
in. On June 19, 1991, Escobar successfully persuaded the Constitutional Assembly to 
prohibit extradition under guidelines of a revamped Colombian constitution.103 On the 
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same day, Escobar negotiated his surrender to authorities and was detained in a self-
developed luxury prison called La Catedral.104 Thirteen months later, Escobar escaped 
and resumed his battle against the state.  
While the extradition of cartel leaders did not defeat the Medellín cartel, the threat 
of extradition proved to be a valuable bargaining chip for both sides. Although Escobar 
returned to hiding, the negotiated surrender of other prominent cartel leaders proved the 
importance of the extradition policy. After his escape, Escobar found himself isolated as 
his closest allies sat in Colombian prisons. Meanwhile, the CNP was reenergizing itself to 
capitalize on Escobar’s weaknesses, and finally put an end to the Medellín cartel. 
c. Law Enforcement Strategy
(1) Bloque de Búsqueda. In addition to the changes in extradition policy,
Escobar’s excessive behavior triggered a reorganization of the CNP. In 1989, the 
government created a 200-man police force called Bloque de Búsqueda (Search Bloc), 
which was dedicated to hunting down the leaders of the Medellín cartel. Escobar quickly 
placed a bounty on their heads, costing the lives of 30 uniformed Search Bloc officers 
within the first 15 days of operations. While the loss of human life was devastating, it 
stiffened the resolve of surviving CNP officers to defeat the cartel at all costs.105  
The Search Bloc began conducting raids within Escobar’s territory, the first of 
which narrowly missed capturing the drug kingpin.106 Its subsequent efforts pressured the 
Medellín cartel, precipitating the most extreme levels of violence since the cartel’s 
inception. While somewhat effective, the Search Bloc could not unilaterally achieve 
information parity with Escobar and his early warning system. Cooperation with the 
United States provided the necessary support to Colombian security forces and pressured 
the Medellín cartel into submission. 
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(2) U.S. Assistance. The U.S. DEA began monitoring cartel activity as early 
as 1975.107 Surveillance and interdiction focused within US borders, and little was 
executed on Colombian soil. The Avianca airline bombing of 1989 labeled Escobar and 
the Medellín cartel as direct threats to American citizens, and resulted in the deployment 
of the DEA and U.S. Special Operations Forces to support the Colombian government.108  
These units played a vital role in filling a gap in operational intelligence and 
technical surveillance.109 First, a unit code-named Centra Spike provided reconnaissance 
and surveillance aircraft as well as ground tracking capabilities to pinpoint the location of 
Medellín leadership. Additionally, elements of Delta Force were deployed to train, advise 
and assist the Search Bloc.110 Its assistance provided the expertise that was lacking in 
CNP planning and execution of operations. While these U.S. forces enhanced the Search 
Bloc, they could not provide the necessary human intelligence to compete with the 
cartel’s network of informants. Consequently, the Search Bloc sought covert support 
from a loose band of criminals named Los Pepes (Perseguidos por Pablo Escobar/People 
persecuted by Pablo Escobar).111 
(3) Collaboration with Los Pepes. By the end of 1992, Escobar was the only 
founder of the Medellín cartel who remained alive and free. Meanwhile, his 
indiscriminate acts of violence had taken their toll on the population. As a response, Los 
Pepes developed in early 1993 as a homegrown vigilante movement, dedicated to 
retaliate against the Medellín cartel for terrorist acts that injured innocent civilians.112 
Officially, the Colombian government condemned the actions of Los Pepes, however the 
Search Bloc maintained clandestine ties to the vigilante group.113 From the United States’  
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perspective, particularly the DEA and special mission units in Colombia, an indigenous 
vigilante group dedicated to eliminating its number one enemy provided an important 
means of weakening the cartel.114 
Los Pepes proved its effectiveness in further isolating Pablo Escobar. By 
November 1993, the vigilantes assassinated 50 of Escobar’s associates and destroyed 
roughly 20 properties belonging to members of the Medellín cartel. This home grown 
movement established an information advantage that the Search Bloc and supporting U.S. 
units could not gain, and resulted in the complete isolation of Escobar. 
3. The End of Pablo Escobar 
On December 2, 1993, through the aid of U.S. signal intelligence capabilities, the 
Search Bloc killed Pablo Escobar in a small Medellín neighborhood.115 While Escobar’s 
death did not affect exports of cocaine to the United States, it succeeded in eliminating 
the largest source of violence within Colombia’s borders.116 The Medellín cartel ceased 
to exist, leaving a significant vacuum in the drug market; one that would be quickly filled 
by the Cali cartel. 
B. LAST MEN STANDING: TARGETING THE CALI CARTEL 
The fall of Pablo Escobar eliminated the Cali cartel’s main competition in the 
international cocaine trade. As the last men standing, the criminals from Cali took over 
any illicit operations that were vacated by the removal of the Medellín cartel. The 
Colombian government sought to build on its successes and turned its focus towards 
defeating the Cali cartel.  
Members of the Colombian government pursued a more diplomatic approach 
against the Cali leadership. As a less violent criminal organization, the hatred that the 
CNP internalized against Escobar was not nearly as ubiquitous when targeting Cali 
personnel. This created obstacles that were overcome in a number of ways. First, the 
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United States increased pressure on the Colombian government to produce tangible 
results in disrupting the cartel’s operations. Second, the appointment of General Rosso 
José Serrano revolutionized the CNP and largely reduced corruption within the ranks. 
Finally, a growing number of cartel informants provided the necessary intelligence to 
effectively target the cartel system and bring the organization to its knees.  
1. U.S. Pressure 
In the eyes of U.S. officials, the elimination of the Medellín threat was only part 
of the equation. In December 1991, DEA officials discovered that more than 15 tons of 
cocaine was concealed by Cali associates117 in cement posts and transported through 
Miami ports.118 To avoid stiff prison sentences, those arrested began cooperating with 
U.S. officials and corroborated information that identified Cali leadership as responsible 
for all cartel operations.119 The U.S. government subsequently applied pressure on 
numerous Colombian administrations to dismantle the Cali cartel. Unsatisfied with 
Colombia’s efforts, in 1994 the United States revoked Colombia’s eligibility to receive 
foreign aid.120 The Colombian government was forced to reorganize the CNP and put 
forth a serious effort to defeat the Cali cartel. 
2. Reorganizing the Colombian National Police 
The cartel’s most effective means of eliminating law enforcement interference 
with its drug operations was through bribery. U.S. pressure facilitated the appointment of 
an honest and dedicated officer to purge the CNP of corruption and professionalize the 
force into a respected and capable organization. 
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a. General Serrano 
In 1994, Ernesto Samper appointed General Rosso José Serrano as commander of 
the CNP. While Serrano continued the fight against drug trafficking, he also sought to 
eliminate police corruption and establish a framework of institutional reform within the 
organization.121 Over time, the combination of Serrano’s priorities improved the CNP’s 
reputation, popular support, and results against the Cali cartel. 
General Serrano recognized that internal corruption contributed to the difficulties 
in targeting the Cali cartel. He instituted a controversial cleansing of the force, removing 
almost 8,000 police officers between 1995 and 2000.122 While their removal did not 
completely eliminate corruption within the force, most accepted Serrano’s policy as a 
genuine effort to purge the rampant corruption that had previously characterized the 
CNP. Under Serrano’s command, complaints about police corruption were reduced and 
the force was able to place a greater focus on its Cali operations.123 Though the threat of 
operational compromise still existed, this no longer encompassed every operation against 
the cartel.  
Serrano also reorganized the management structure of the force. He initiated a 
program of professional education to develop the managerial and leadership skills of 
police officers.124 Additionally, Serrano coordinated joint training programs with a 
number of U.S. units, including the DEA, Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), Marine 
Corps, and Army Special Forces.125 The professionalization of the CNP notably 
enhanced its effectiveness, allowed for fundamental changes within the organization, and 
ultimately produced a more effective force. 
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b. Cooperation with the DEA 
The CNP could not suspend its pursuit of the Cali cartel in order to institute 
Serrano’s changes. Concurrent to the organization’s reform, Serrano formally moved the 
now 500-man Search Bloc headquarters to Cali in order to focus on defeating the 
cartel.126 The Search Bloc, advised by a two-man team from the DEA, initially conducted 
a series of raids against Cali leadership with little success. Similar to the Medellín cartel, 
Cali’s early warning system extended through street vendors, hotel clerks, and thousands 
of taxi drivers; gaining reliable, actionable intelligence was extremely difficult.127 
Security forces had to penetrate the system and attack Cali’s intelligence network. 
The U.S. deployed high-tech audio intercept ground equipment and aircraft to 
enhance the surveillance capabilities of Colombian forces.128 Its intercepts were essential 
in intelligence gathering activities as well as building criminal cases against cartel 
members. The combination of intelligence capabilities, Search Bloc raids, and 
psychological operations in the form of leaflets and monetary awards began to take a toll 
on cartel leadership. Worried about internal betrayal, they ordered the murder of roughly 
75 people within a six-week period. Regardless of the spike in violence, the information 
network continued to grow. In June 1995, the CNP and its DEA counterparts captured 
Gilberto Rodríguez-Orejuela.129 This marked the first major victory against the Cali 
cartel and signaled a shift in balance that put remaining cartel leaders on the run.  
Law enforcement efforts against drug traffickers on U.S. soil compounded the 
pressure on Cali operations. The arrest and indictment of Cali operatives in Miami placed 
dozens of new potential informants in the hands of authorities. In addition, Colombian-
based operatives viewed the CNP’s decision to capture (not kill) Gilberto Rodríguez as a 
sign that they could negotiate surrender and work with the government.130 The growing 
number of high level informants proved too much for the remaining Cali leadership to 
                                                 
126 Ibid., 203. 
127 Chepesiuk, The Bullet and the Bribe, 206. 
128 “Killing Pablo,” CNN Presents. 
129 Chepesiuk, The Bullet and the Bribe, 207, 211.  
130 Ibid., 218. 
 37 
contend with. In July 1995, authorities arrested José Santacruz-Londoño while dining in a 
Bogotá restaurant.131 One month later, a joint raid of DEA, CNP, and Colombian Navy 
SEALs resulted in the arrest of the cartel’s true kingpin, Miguel Rodríguez.132 The cartel 
was essentially decapitated; the Colombian government had succeeded in taking down 
the largest drug enterprise in the country’s history. 
In all, the top seven members of the Cali leadership were either arrested or 
surrendered within a span of three months. Heavy pressure through constant raids and 
non-kinetic activities such as leaflets and monetary reward offers influenced a number of 
cartel members to negotiate with government officials rather than continue a life on the 
run. A criminal-friendly extradition policy further enticed cartel members to surrender 
and begin cooperation with security forces. Finally, the robust human intelligence 
network and multi-national cooperation triggered the collapse of the Cali cartel’s empire. 
C. CONCLUSION 
The elimination of these large cartels failed to eliminate international cocaine 
trafficking and distribution. More accurately, their removal reduced widespread violence 
and a relative lack of government control. From this perspective, Colombia developed 
and executed a “successful” law enforcement model that reined in violent organized 
crime. This was reflected in both law enforcement reform and the targeting of specific 
elements of the cartel’s conversion mechanisms. First, security forces recognized that 
both cartels maintained a centralized structure. In both cases, a kingpin strategy targeted 
respective leadership through kinetic and non-kinetic means. A flexible extradition policy 
facilitated the surrender of various leaders, and enabled law enforcement to gain valuable 
information from turned informants to conduct lethal operations with increased 
effectiveness. Second, the creation of a professional force dedicated to the removal of the 
cartels was necessary to mitigate corruption and avoid compromising operational 
security. By protecting its own information, Colombian law enforcement indirectly 
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affected the cartels’ ability to convert information on security forces into valuable 
intelligence to protect their operations. Third, U.S. assistance provided unique training 
and intercept capabilities to effectively target the cartels’ intelligence and 
communications mechanisms. A variety of means (human intelligence, signal 
intelligence, information operations, etc.) allowed security forces to infiltrate the cartels’ 
network. Last, and most effective, was the cooperation with Los Pepes. This relationship 
provided an unprecedented gateway to information that weakened the cartels’ personnel 
structure and isolated leadership. 
Unfortunately, the resultant power vacuum opened a window of opportunity for 
other transnational organized crime syndicates to form and grow in power. Mexican 
cartels assumed control of drug trafficking activity and adjusted their structure to fulfill 
all elements vacated by the Colombians. The next chapter analyzes México’s cartels as a 
system of inputs and outputs in order to illuminate their similarities and differences from 
the Colombians. This will, in turn, help determine the applicability of a Colombian law 
enforcement model to contemporary México. 
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IV. MÉXICO: A DANGEROUS PATH 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Some concerned observers suggest that México has been heading down a 
dangerous path linked to organized crime. From this point of view, the criminal violence 
once synonymous with the Medellín and Cali cartels of Colombia now poses a threat to 
Mexican authorities. The demise of the large Colombian cartels in the 1990s reduced 
extreme levels of violence, but did little to eliminate the global demand for narcotics. As 
the world’s largest consumer of illegal drugs, the United States maintained the demand 
that allowed criminal organizations in México to assume any operational void in illicit 
drug supply into the twenty-first century.133 
To defeat organized crime, some have suggested that México should apply the 
Colombian law enforcement model that defeated the cartels of Medellín and Cali. Others 
suggest that a cookie-cutter approach is misguided and contextually inaccurate. The first 
step to determine if Colombia’s model applies is to evaluate the functional elements of 
México’s cartel system. How does it compare to the Colombian system? Only then can 
one assess the suitability of a Colombian law enforcement model to the dynamics of 
México’s criminal environment. 
In December 2006, President Felipe Calderón launched federal police and 
military units in operations against cartels in nine of México’s 32 states.134 The cartels 
responded with a wave of violence and territorial disputes that continue to affect the 
country in 2014.135 Today, regionally-based cartels control the majority of illicit  
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operations within México’s borders.136 This chapter examines these cartels as a system of 
inputs and outputs. While I examine all of México’s cartel activity, I focus on three of the 
country’s most menacing cartels.  
In early 2014, Mexican security forces prioritized their efforts against the Sinaloa 
cartel, Los Zetas, and the Knights Templar (Los Caballeros Templarios).137 Each cartel 
maintains its operations through a complex system of inputs and outputs. 
Notwithstanding, this model appropriately dissects the inputs that allowed cartels to 
sustain their current levels of influence, explains the conversion mechanisms that 
contribute to operations, and outlines their subsequent outputs. 
B. CARTEL BACKGROUND 
One of México’s most potent criminal organizations (with a long history) operates 
from the Pacific-northwestern coastal state of Sinaloa, and accounts for roughly 25% of 
drugs that enter the United States. The Sinaloa cartel is currently led by Joaquín “El 
Chapo” Guzmán Loera, who is annually recognized by Forbes Magazine as one of the 
most powerful people in the world.138 Mexican authorities arrested El Chapo in February 
2014; what exactly his arrest means for the day-to-day operation of the Sinaloa cartel 
remains unclear. Nonetheless, the cartel is considered by U.S. intelligence services to be 
México’s most powerful criminal organization.139 Reportedly established in 1990 with 
deep roots in Sinaloa and other parts of the Pacific coast,140 the Sinaloa cartel’s control of 
drug trafficking and other illicit activity extends through 17 states, from the northern 
cities of Tijuana and Juarez along the western coast of México.141  
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Meanwhile in terms of violence, experts consider Los Zetas to be México’s most 
threatening criminal organization.142 Formed in the mid-1990s as a paramilitary wing of 
the Gulf cartel, Los Zetas was originally composed of defectors from México’s Special 
Forces.143 Between the years 2008–2010, the group fragmented from the Gulf cartel and 
established its own illicit operations. It currently controls drug corridors from northeast 
México that extend south along the country’s east coast and into Central America. 
Although Los Zetas leader, Miguel Angel Treviño Morales, was apprehended by 
Mexican military forces in July 2013, the cartel continues its reputation for violence and 
intimidation that sets it apart from its rivals.144  
Another criminal organization that has risen to prominence in recent years is the 
Knights Templar cartel, located in México’s southwestern state of Michoacán. Following 
a series of effective raids against La Familia Michoacána cartel in late 2010, the Knights 
Templar fragmented from La Familia and gained control of a significant portion of 
illegal operations in Michoacán.145 The recent emergence of organized vigilante groups 
against the Knights Templar has reduced its influence, but the associated violence has 
gained international attention and made targeting the cartel a priority for the Mexican 
government.146 These cartels represent a relevant sample of the influence of modern 
organized crime in México. A study of its structure allows one to compare and contrast 
these modern-day cartels to its Colombian predecessors. 
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C. THE CARTEL SYSTEM 
1. Endogenous Inputs 
a. Coercion 
Similar to our analysis of Colombia’s cartels in Chapter II, I first examine 
endogenous inputs in the form kidnapping and murder, illegal tax collection, and 
destruction of property.147  
(1) Kidnapping, Assassinations, Torture. Inherent in the day-to-day operations 
of México’s cartels is perpetual violence and insecurity in areas in which they operate. 
From 2006-2010, cartel assassins murdered more than 2,500 policemen, soldiers, judges, 
and politicians.148 Furthermore, a government study found that in the same period, the 
country’s kidnapping rate increased over 300 percent.149 Currently, Los Zetas represent 
the most vicious form of violent behavior in México with repeated kidnappings and acts 
of mass murder. The Knights Templar also resort to torture and extreme violence against 
locals who refuse to comply with its demands.150 The group’s outrageous behavior 
includes kidnapping, raping, and the killing of innocents, particularly in the state of 
Michoacán.151 The Sinaloa cartel can be very vicious; however, its approach to violence 
tends to be more discreet.152 It prohibits kidnapping on its home turf, only permitting 
such activity against rivals in other parts of México.153 
Much of the violence is aimed at coercing rival cartels. In March 2009, the 
Sinaloa cartel reportedly dumped a collection of dismembered bodies in Zeta territory 
with a message signed “Sincerely, El Chapo.”154 Meanwhile, the very emergence of Los 
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Zetas and the Knights Templar was a product of inter-cartel violence. The level of 
violence is, to a certain degree, a result of the syndicates’ respective positions in the 
overall order of organized crime, and their desire to rise up the totem pole. A “shared” 
commitment to criminal violence, however, is only one element of an increasingly 
diverse criminal system. Another growing initiative of numerous cartels is the extortion 
of legitimate businesses within the cartels’ respective areas of control. 
(2) Forcible Tax Collection. México’s cartels developed a proclivity for 
forced taxing and other forms of extortion. Los Zetas are notorious for rampant extortion 
of individuals and businesses large and small.155 Similarly, the Knights Templar disrupt 
the daily activities of average civilians within areas under its control. Farmers are forced 
to pay quotas for the production of their crops while providing the cartel with discounted 
prices. In many instances, its extortion scheme has turned local economies upside 
down.156 Even Catholic priests are no longer immune to extortion efforts. In December 
2013, cartel members threatened the country’s main Catholic seminary in México City 
with payment demands.157 
In contrast to its rivals, the Sinaloa cartel largely avoids extortion activity and 
focuses on drug trafficking operations.158 Enough profit can be earned through the 
complicity of locals in drug production and transportation. Often more than complicity, 
large parts of Sinaloa are tied to drug trade, whether it be through familial ties or various 
forms of employment.159 Forced extortion threatens to anger the population and 
adversely impacts Sinaloa activity. Nonetheless, forcible taxing has become a significant 
issue in México. Should locals resist, they face a credible threat of the confiscation or 
complete destruction of their property. 
(3) Destruction/Confiscation of Property. Cartels typically resort to the 
confiscation or destruction of property, particularly in turf wars with rival cartels or local 
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residents and business owners who refuse to comply with demands. The Sinaloa cartel 
engages in numerous inter-cartel battles to facilitate the expansion of illicit activities. The 
cartel does not hesitate to attack local businesses affiliated with its rivals, destroying 
these establishments with firebombs, grenades, and small-arms attacks to confiscate 
contested territory.160 In other examples, the cartels directly target the local population. 
The Knights Templar force those indebted to the cartel to officially sign over the titles to 
their homes.161 Local farms are confiscated as well and used as an additional source of 
income. Coercive violence remains a significant problem in México. Recognizing that 
non-violent behavior can be just as useful, cartels include various non-kinetic 
contributions in persuading others to comply with their demands. 
b. Persuasion 
(1) Ideological Preparation. Similar to Colombia’s cartel structure, there is a 
general absence of any specific ideology that drives the organizations’ activities. 
Notwithstanding, the cartels emphasize their religious affiliation, no matter how 
contradictory it might be to their actions. It is impossible to ignore the religious 
undertones within a country where 88% of the population considers themselves to be at 
least nominally Catholic.162 While for most cartels, Catholicism is a mere extension of 
the greater Mexican culture, one particular cartel promotes a relatively extreme ideology 
that guides the framework for the cartel’s existence.  
The Knights Templar cartel promulgates certain spiritual beliefs within the 
communities that it controls. It draws from the ideological beliefs of La Familia cartel’s 
deceased founder, Nazario Moreno, who published his principles in a book called Mis 
Pensamientos (My Thoughts). 163 Ironically, Moreno propagates a belief in humility, 
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honesty, generosity, and love of God.164 The Knights Templar reveres its deposed leader 
in various shrines, advertising themselves as disciples of his word. Its current leader, 
Servando “La Tuta” Gomez, organizes the cartel under these tenets and vows to “fight 
materialism, injustice, and tyranny.”165 
Formal indoctrination of religious beliefs is relatively distinct to the Knights 
Templar cartel. The Sinaloa cartel simply operates as a profit-driven corporation, while 
Los Zetas pursue a reputation for ruthlessness. Fundamental to the latter organization is 
the belief that “if you frighten your enemy enough, you may defeat him without having to 
fight.”166 Although there is no over-arching ideology in cartel activity, most cartels 
recognize a need for some fundamental framework from which to promote and 
distinguish their respective organizations. 
(2) Discrediting of Established Authority. Inherent in the activities of illicit 
organizations is the opposing force of legitimate government authority. Cartels attempt to 
discredit the practices of government authority in order to secure popular support within 
their respective environments.  
Cartels use propaganda and media as publicity tools and means of slander at every 
opportunity against legitimate authority. In 2009, “La Tuta” Gomez of the Knights 
Templar professed that the cartel’s fight is not against Mexican citizens, but aimed at the 
federal police who attack its families.167 Later that year, a cartel-sponsored demonstration 
in Michoacán displayed a banner that stated “The people are tired of this military 
invasion. We are living in a state of siege.”168 In December 2013, Los Zetas posted 
banners in Ciudad Victoria Tamaulipas after hosting a Christmas party for local families. 
The banners read “the government has behaved irresponsibly in Ciudad Victoria by not 
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providing gifts and happiness to children in need.”169 These are only a few examples of a 
common practice in cartel operations. From Monterrey to Michoacán, cartels assist in 
public demonstrations against authorities.170 It frustrates the efforts of politicians and 
security forces to win over regional populations. To reinforce the efforts of banner 
propaganda, cartels utilize another form of non-kinetic persuasion: bribery. 
(3) Rewards (Payments). The cartels use monetary payments as both a form of 
bribery and a rewards system for violence. Bribery is a necessary component of every 
cartel’s operations. The corruption associated with bribery has plagued Mexican society 
and its governing powers for decades. México’s ruling political party, the Institutional 
Revolutionary Party (PRI), dominated twentieth century politics in México through a 
reliance on corruption and payoffs at all levels of governance and security to maintain a 
relative peace.171  
The current drug war suggests that no inroads have been made to previous norms 
in corruption and bribery. México’s former Public Safety Secretary, Genaro Garcia Luna, 
estimated that cartels spend upwards of $1.2 billion a year on bribery efforts.172 The 
Sinaloa cartel commonly bribes authorities at the municipal, state, and federal level. 
Politicians, prosecutors, law enforcement, military, customs officials (U.S. and Mexican), 
and even national-level leadership have accepted bribes; no one is immune. “El Chapo” 
Guzman built his power base while incarcerated, as he bribed officials for preferential 
treatment and ultimately, to aid in his 2001 escape from a maximum security prison.173 
Even the country’s former drug czar (director of anti-drug policies), Noe Ramirez, was 
formally charged in 2008 with receiving monthly bribes of $450,000.174 Bribery is a 
systemic issue that is crucial to the success of cartel operations. 
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In addition to bribery, cartel leaders reward violent acts conducted by para-
military and low-level cartel operatives. Most disturbing is that estimates suggest that a 
murder typically costs a cartel 1,000 pesos, or roughly $85.175 The absurdly low rate 
explains how desperate low-level sicarios are to earn a paycheck. Furthermore, it 
suggests that the multi-billion dollar industry that is the Mexican drug trade will not run 
dry of willing assassins in the foreseeable future. Coercive violence, rampant extortion, 
distorted ideology and aggressive bribery tactics all contribute to the Mexican cartel 
system, and provide the necessary space to conduct illicit operations. 
c. Recruits 
Los Zetas are well known as defectors from the Mexican Army’s Special Forces, 
who initially served as a paramilitary wing of the Gulf cartel. After fragmenting into its 
own entity, Los Zetas leadership used military contacts in Guatemala’s Special Forces, 
Los Kaibiles, to expand its size and area of operations. Clandestine recruitment channels 
allowed new recruits to attend training camps that ensured a “professional” edge in 
violence against its rivals.176 The associated reputation serves as a recruitment in itself, as 
Los Zetas even advertise with banners hung from bridges suggesting “the Zetas 
operations group wants you, soldier or ex-soldier.”177 
The Sinaloa cartel recruits from existing gangs from the United States to South 
America. The reputed Mara Salvatrucha (MS-13) affiliates from El Salvador and 
Honduras provide an intimidating arm to transport drugs and battle with security forces 
and rival cartels on behalf of the Sinaloa cartel.178 
The Knights Templar recruit in part by suggesting it is an honorable and religious 
cause that is dedicated to the hope of a better life. This theme appeals to potential recruits 
in poverty-stricken Michoacán.179 The violent nature of organized crime makes for a 
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relatively large turnover in personnel. Unfortunately, a grim economic situation in rural 
México ensures a plentiful pool of young men on which the cartels continuously focus 
their recruiting efforts. 
d. Information 
Another important input in organized crime is a sustained advantage in 
information on the environment, rivals, and security force activity. Bribery of local law 
enforcement is crucial in gaining an information advantage against adversaries. Los Zetas 
employ local security forces on its payroll to the extent that police not only turn a blind 
eye to illicit activity, but actively participate in murder and kidnapping.180 
Another method of information gathering is found in the employment of the local 
populace. Locals have intimate knowledge of their surroundings and can provide early 
warning of any out of the ordinary activity. A segment of the local populace that cartels 
consider particularly valuable are females. As Ioan Grillo explains, women are used to 
create spy networks to gather information on “rivals, police, politicians, or anything the 
cartel wants to find out about,” providing an edge on competition and a step ahead of law 
enforcement efforts to defeat them. 181 
Finally, cartels understand the need to protect sensitive information regarding 
their activities. They punish potential turncoats in an effort to deter other potential 
informants from cooperating with law enforcement.182 An information advantage is 
crucial to the sustainment of illicit operations and ultimately, cartel survival.  
2. Exogenous Inputs 
a. Publicity 
Cartels recognize that to sustain their activities, some inputs must be derived from 
external sources. Public outreach through both technical and rudimentary means provide 
a platform to propagate the cartels’ agenda. In an age of global reach and cyber 
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capabilities, the cartels adopted internet media outlets to intimidate rivals, deter potential 
informants, and promote their respective organizations. Los Zetas occasionally use social 
media such as YouTube to promulgate its violent behavior.183 Members of the Knights 
Templar post provocative images that glorify its activities and boast of its status as a band 
of ruthless assassins.184 “La Tuta” Gomez appears in numerous television interviews to 
justify his cartel’s existence as a necessary evil.185 He once even phoned in to a popular 
television program to explain that his cartel was protecting the people of Michoacán from 
corrupt politicians and the threat of Los Zetas.186 Through bribery and intimidation, 
cartels influence the message and commentary of media outlets.187 
Another form of publicity comes in the form of song. The narco-culture is 
glorified through many narcocorridos, or drug ballads. One of the most well-known 
bands of northern México, Grupo Cartel de Sinaloa, dedicates its music to the lore of the 
Sinaloa cartel.188 Narcocorridos are so influential that the Mexican government has 
banned such music on public radio.189 Despite the government’s efforts, the lyrics 
connect with rural communities and celebrate the cartels’ activity. 
While technology and media provide access to a wider population base, 
rudimentary publicity remains an important aspect of the cartels’ information operations. 
Cartels hang “narco-banners” from bridges and hand out flyers throughout their 
respective areas of control.190 Images of these banners are captured in newspapers and 
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television outlets, further magnifying their coverage.191 The propaganda justifies narco-
activity, strengthens a base of support for cartel operations, and provides for the 
unprecedented reach of cartel influence. 
b. Material 
Exogenous material support includes illicit production of narcotics, use of foreign 
real estate for transportation and storage of product, and operational assistance from 
indigenous personnel. While the majority of marijuana is produced within Mexican and 
U.S. borders, cartels rely on exogenous provision of other high-demand narcotics. 
Cocaine and some forms of heroin are purchased at wholesale prices from Colombia and 
other Central and South American locations.192 Furthermore, in 2011 cartels relied on 
252 tons of chemical imports from China and India to produce methamphetamines.193 
In addition to production support, Mexican cartels seek control over Central 
American drug routes that connect bulk distribution in South America. The Sinaloa cartel 
actively operates in the jungles of Honduras, while Los Zetas distribute narcotics and 
extort local businesses in Guatemala. 194 It even recruits locals to fight against the 
Guatemalan Army.195 Exogenous support is a necessary component of México’s 
organized crime that facilitates various mechanisms, including organization of personnel, 
financing, logistics, intelligence operations, and communications. 
3. Conversion Mechanisms 
a. Personnel Organization 
As with any large organization, a coherent distribution of personnel is a necessary 
component of the overall system. A study of Mexican cartels suggests that, similar to 
Colombian cartels, leadership maintains control of operations down to the lowest level. 
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“La Tuta” Gomez of the Knights Templar cartel extends this control to the mining and 
export of illegal iron ore, reportedly controlling all aspects of its procurement, 
transportation, and sale.196 Similarly, “El Chapo” Guzman is described as “obsessive” 
and “micromanaging.” Prior to his arrest in February 2014, “El Chapo” reportedly 
maintained strict oversight of the logistical network that produced and distributed all the 
cartel’s narcotics.197 
In the traditional structure, the “godfathers” direct capos in all activities, who then 
disseminate orders to local turf commanders and their associated cells.198 Leaders 
maintain a narrow span of control and authority on significant decisions. At the ground 
level, there is a standardization of work processes for the operating core to execute.199 
Proficiency in the conduct of illicit activities is important, and so too is a sense of trust 
and loyalty amongst personnel operating for each cartel. 
To mitigate the potential for turncoats, some cartels develop a structure of inter-
marriage amongst its members and associates. The familial ties secure a sense of 
allegiance and trust that is crucial to the operational security of cartel activity.200 
Additionally, cartel activities rely on extensive cooperation with personnel and 
organizations outside of the cartel. Alliances between cartels constantly evolve, forming 
when it is to the advantage of those involved. Incorporating these alliances into the 
personnel structure is quite difficult, as alliances are broken as quickly as they are started. 
Leaders of the Knights Templar once formed a relationship with Los Zetas, which was 
quickly broken once the two cartels began battling over contested territory.201 
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The danger posed by both law enforcement and rival cartels requires an 
organizational structure characterized by secrecy and compartmentalization. For example, 
no good estimate exists to accurately describe the Sinaloa cartel’s size, as estimates range 
from 150 to 150,000.202 The compartmentalization of each cartels’ organization is 
necessary as law enforcement and rivals pursue sensitive information that is vital to a 
cartel’s existence. 
Finally, cartels adopted the paramilitary wing as a component of personnel 
organization to protect their interests. The once powerful Gulf cartel is largely credited 
with establishing the first para-military wing, with Los Zetas.203 Other cartels adopted a 
similar structure in the face of increased violence, preferring a paramilitary force built 
from the many soldiers who have deserted the Mexican Army.204 Cartels have developed 
an intricate web of personnel organization that addresses all their interests and generally 
maintains the flexibility to adapt in a volatile environment of illicit activity. 
b. Financing 
Modeling legitimate business, criminal organizations establish a mechanism to 
recycle profit into the system. The macro level of narco-trafficking has a distinct method 
of self-financing the production and transportation of illegal drugs. A cartel in México 
can purchase a kilo of cocaine in the Andean regions of Colombia for roughly $2,000 and 
sell that same kilo at wholesale prices in the United States for $30,000. In total, experts 
estimate that gross revenue from México’s drug trafficking into U.S. territory amounts to 
more than $6 Billion.205 Cartels reinvest these revenues into drug operations as well as 
legitimate business endeavors.206 
Los Zetas expanded its financing mechanisms to include operations and revenue 
beyond drug trafficking, creating a truly diversified criminal enterprise. Extortion of local 
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businesses and traffic control points along drug trafficking routes add to the illegitimate 
revenue of the organization.207 Other illicit activities include kidnapping, prostitution 
rings, oil and gas syphoning, even a vast distribution of pirated DVDs. Ioan Grillo refers 
to such a diversified organization as a criminal paramilitary complex.208  
Similar to Los Zetas, The Knights Templar inherited a diversified operation that 
includes activities outside of drug trafficking. While substantial revenues come from 
methamphetamines, extortion of Michoacán residents provides another source of 
significant income. 209 Additionally, the cartel smuggles iron ore to the Far East through 
Chinese firms.210 In today’s criminal environment, cartels pursue every effort towards 
financial growth and expansion. 
c. Logistics 
A third instrument in the distribution of illegal product is a sophisticated logistics 
network. The mid-1980s crackdown by U.S. authorities on Colombian cocaine shipments 
through the Caribbean led to the improvement of ground transportation routes through 
México. Nonetheless, cocaine and other illegal drugs travel via ship, submarine, or light 
aircraft from Central and South America to México.211 The drugs are then transported to 
the United States through a variety of means, including submersible watercraft and 
intricate tunnel systems that extend underneath the U.S.-México border.212  
Notwithstanding the need for secrecy in order to avoid the confiscation of illegal 
products, most cartels tend to mirror legitimate commodity businesses in their logistical 
organization. For example, many large corporations move their facilities to countries that 
offer the lowest cost of labor and production. Similarly, the Sinaloa cartel recently began 
growing marijuana in remote forests of the United States to reduce the cost of 
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transportation and eliminate the challenge of successfully crossing the border.213 In doing 
so, cartels face obstacles in the return of cash profits to México. Once money is 
consolidated and brought across the border, professional money launderers bank a portion 
of the illicit profits while the rest remains in cash.214 The cartels’ diversification of the 
massive drug proceeds makes it quite difficult for anti-money laundering operations to 
achieve a significant impact. In order to sustain such complex personnel, logistics, and 
financing structures, cartels rely as much, if not more, on accurate information.  
d. Intelligence 
A fourth mechanism, crucial to the sustainment of cartel activity, is a robust 
intelligence network. Cartels in México understand the importance of an information 
advantage over security forces to maintain their illicit operations. As a result, they 
employ countless civilians to report on law enforcement activity. Michael Braun, former 
DEA agent, explained that in some cities, almost every taxi driver provides information 
to cartel members on law enforcement activity.215 As a conversion mechanism, the 
cartels combine all information provided by locals and corrupt authority to maintain an 
advantage over their adversaries. Such a robust intelligence network has been critical to 
the longevity of cartel operations in México. 
e. Communication 
A fifth mechanism involves the ability to communicate through covert and 
clandestine means. This mechanism directly affects the ability to preserve information 
regarding the cartel structure, allows coordination of product shipments, and facilitates 
the execution of small-scale attacks. In the age of technological advances, cartels 
communicate through secret networks with cell phones and radios that transmit via 
internal antennas and repeaters. These advanced networks cover hundreds of miles, 
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allowing for communication between operatives with a mitigated risk of compromise.216 
All conversion mechanisms serve as essential elements of cartel operations. They 
function together and provide the necessary means for violent outputs that threaten 
security in numerous regions of México. 
4. Outputs 
The violent outputs of some Mexican cartels have a striking similarity to that of 
Colombia’s cartels in the 1980s–1990s. Some argue that signs of sabotage, violence 
against individuals, and small scale attacks parallel, and in some cases, exceed the 
violence witnessed in Colombia’s struggle. 
a. Sabotage 
Fortunately, the drug war has not seen any large scale acts of sabotage aimed at 
the Mexican government. Instead, a few cartels aim to disrupt the local population, 
particularly when they are noncompliant with cartel demands. Most notorious in this 
realm is the Knights Templar, who resorted to various acts of sabotage in efforts to 
subdue a growing number of vigilante groups in Michoacán. In some instances, the cartel 
has destroyed vital resources such as electricity and gas stations. In other cases, it has 
punished noncompliant business owners by torching their businesses to the ground.217 
Other cartels tend to avoid any action that disrupts the livelihood of populations in mass. 
Most acts of sabotage deliberately target individuals who impede or otherwise adversely 
affect cartel operations.  
b. Violence Against Individuals 
A large lesson from the Medellín cartel’s demise is that high-profile attacks 
typically draw unwanted attention. Even within México’s borders, the 1985 slaying of 
DEA agent Kiki Camarena triggered unrelenting pressure by U.S. officials for justice.218 
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Unfortunately, the pursuit of wealth and power sometimes blinds criminals to history’s 
lessons. Such was the case in the 2008 slaying of Edgar Millan, the acting head of the 
Mexican federal police.219 Three years later, Los Zetas killed a U.S. Immigration and 
Customs Enforcement (ICE) agent on a San Luis Patosi highway.220 Most recently was 
the July 2013 assassination of Navy Vice-Admiral Carlos Miguel Salazar by the Knights 
Templar.221 While these actions likely stiffened the resolve of security forces, they 
display the powerful capability of numerous cartels to threaten the highest levels of their 
state opposition.  
c. Small-Scale Attacks 
Each cartel employs its respective para-military force to protect their interests as 
well as attack rivals and government forces. Over seven years after ex-President Felipe 
Calderón initiated his ‘drug war,’ cartel operatives use assault rifles and rocket-propelled 
grenades to attack police stations in some parts of the country.222 Ambush-style killings, 
known as ejecuciones (executions), account for the majority of casualties in this tragic 
wave of violence.223 In rare instances, cartels even employ car bombs against their 
adversaries.224 The recent increase in violence throughout the state of Michoacán has 
triggered the deployment of thousands of Mexican security forces. In response, the 
Knights Templar have staged a number of ambush-style attacks along contested highway 
routes against federal police convoys.225 The coordination and ferocity of the cartels’ 
kinetic capabilities is alarming. Their actions have a stiff impact on Mexican authority, as 
well as the concern of the greater international arena. 
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5. Effects on Authority 
The security problem posed by cartels has had a profound impact at all levels of 
the Mexican government and law enforcement. First, corruption frustrates attempts to 
effectively target cartel operations. Furthermore, the audacity of cartel actions against 
security forces has provoked instances of overreaction by the military or police, which 
adds to support for the cartels. Understandably frustrated by repeated attacks on security 
forces, aggressive responses sometimes result in the death of innocent civilians.226 Last, 
the cartels’ grip on the population traps state authorities in an information disadvantage. 
Similar to the problem faced by Colombian law enforcement against the powerful cartels 
of Cali and Medellín, these challenges pose a tall order for Mexican security forces. The 
state’s current kingpin strategy, while effective at its goal of eliminating high level 
leaders, has not had an enduring impact on cartel activity nor the overall violence 
plaguing the country. México must develop a responsive model that minimizes the 
influence of cartels operating within the country, and reduces violence to manageable 
levels. 
6. Effects on Endogenous Inputs 
Mexican cartels have developed a system far more diversified than their 
Colombian predecessors. Since Calderón’s drug war began in 2006, a number of cartels 
have risen, fallen, and fragmented to create new organizations. In spite of any 
government successes, the cartels have shown a resiliency to fill any power vacancies 
quickly and efficiently. Seven years later, the war rages on with no immediate end in 
sight. One might argue that future contributions, particularly through diversification, will 
help the cartels endure any further government efforts against their operations. If 
government attacks on drug operations yield any success, the cartels might shift their 
efforts towards various other illicit operations. On the other hand, aggressive activities 
such as kidnapping and extortion have the potential to exceed the threshold of violence 
that locals are willing to accept. A potential result might resemble the growing vigilante 
movement in Michoacán against the Knights Templar. While this movement is regionally 
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restricted, its potential success might invigorate other communities to take similar action 
and stand up against the cartels. Albeit different from the Colombian cartel problem in 
the 1980s and 1990s, Mexican security forces must understand the changing dynamics of 
the system and environment in which the cartels operate to truly achieve tangible effects 
and restore security and stability within all regions of their country. 
D. CONCLUSION 
There are numerous cartels currently operating within Mexican borders. Despite 
their differences in style and execution, all pursue similar goals through a system of 
coercive violence, persuasive propaganda, diversified operations, and complex logistics, 
creating a number of challenges for Mexican law enforcement organizations.  
A law enforcement model does not need to be built from scratch. While the 
Colombian model has several distinct differences, there are numerous lessons to be 
learned and applied from Colombia’s law enforcement strategy against the cartels of 
Medellín and Cali in the 1980s and 1990s. The next chapter highlights the differences 
and similarities between Colombia and México, and recommends a hybrid version, 
distinct in its own right, but with numerous attributes of the Colombian law enforcement 
model. The ultimate goal is a law enforcement approach that regains lost territory from 
the cartels and reduces violence to a manageable level through the use of legitimate, 
competent, and respected security forces. 
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V. COMPARING LAW ENFORCEMENT STRATEGIES 
TOWARDS SECURITY AND STABILITY OPERATIONS IN 
COLOMBIA AND MÉXICO 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The Mexican government has entered its eighth year of regional violence and 
instability in the fight against criminal organizations. Estimates suggest as many as 
80,000 casualties since the government’s offensive began in December 2006.227 The first 
six years of the drug war, under the direction of ex-President Felipe Calderón, 
represented a militarization of security forces to defeat cartel operations. The strategy 
included more than 90,000 combat troops, deployed to confront cartels and target their 
leadership through a kingpin strategy.228 Police units maintained a supporting role in the 
offensive, mainly due to corruption and incompetence at municipal, state, and federal 
levels. Although military units were relatively successful in targeting cartel leadership, 
the kingpin strategy unintentionally contributed to violence through the resultant power 
vacuums, fragmentation, and territorial disputes. 
In 2012, PRI candidate Enrique Peña Nieto vowed to reform the militarized 
strategy of his predecessor. Roughly 15 months after he assumed the presidency, the 
military (in particular, the Navy’s Special Forces) still leads operations against organized 
crime as the violence continues in numerous regions of México.229 Although the murder 
rate has dropped by roughly 10 percent, kidnappings have increased by almost 20 
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percent.230 Ioan Grillo suggests that these statistics reflect the diversification of organized 
crime. He also asserts that as the kingpin strategy removes cartel leaders, lower level 
cartel members turn to kidnapping as a source of income.231 As the violence continues, 
so too does the requirement for a law enforcement strategy to regain the confidence of the 
population, reduce the country’s violence, and reclaim control of contested territory 
within México’s borders. 
A successful campaign against organized crime involves various strategies to 
affect the cartel’s ability to produce outputs in the form of violence, influence, and illicit 
production. The Colombian law enforcement model of the late twentieth century defeated 
two powerful drug cartels in the cities of Medellín and Cali by reducing their violent 
capability and influential reach. This resulted in much smaller drug trafficking 
organizations, which were much reduced in violent capability, and substantially abridged 
in coercive capacity.232 There was little to no change in the production and transportation 
of illicit narcotics.  
Although the problems faced in contemporary México are distinct, there are a 
number of similarities to the twentieth century cartels in Medellín and Cali. A hybrid 
version of Colombia’s law enforcement model of the 1990s can assist México in 
developing a strategy to achieve similar effects and reduce cartels to manageable criminal 
organizations. The purpose of this chapter is to examine the differences between 
Colombia and México, acknowledge the similarities, and map out a hybrid law 
enforcement approach that assists Mexican security forces in the ultimate removal of 
large criminal organizations.  
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B. DIFFERENCES BETWEEN COLOMBIAN CARTELS OF THE 1980S 
AND 1990S AND CONTEMPORARY MEXICAN CARTELS 
The law enforcement model applied by the CNP was largely effective at reducing 
the violence and influence of the Medellín and Cali cartels. Nevertheless, this strategy 
should not be viewed as an approach that can be standardized to combat all criminal 
organizations. The Mexican problem embodies several distinct differences from the 
challenges faced by Colombian security forces. Ignoring the differences between the two 
struggles creates the risk of an ineffective approach that limits any form of tangible 
success. 
The most apparent difference between the two countries simply involves the 
number of cartels implicated in illicit activity. The Colombian model targeted two major 
cartel organizations in successive fashion, while the Mexican government simultaneously 
battles numerous cartels within the nation’s borders.233 A successive strategy to defeat 
the cartels one by one would exceed any acceptable timeframe, and likely run the risk 
that one or more cartels grow to unprecedented size and strength.  
Second, Mexican cartels have expanded the spectrum of inputs that contribute to 
the contemporary cartel system. The Medellín and Cali cartels largely avoided extreme 
measures of extortion or violence directly targeting the local populace. Although 
kidnappings and murders were a staple of the Colombian cartels, the majority of these 
operations maintained some relation to the drug trade. In México, numerous cartels 
sustain their wealth and influence through coercive extortion measures aimed at the local 
population.234 When extortion fails, cartels resort to violence to punish the local 
populace.235 This is a stark contrast to Colombian activities that largely focused all 
efforts on maximizing profit through drug trafficking operations. 
Third, the financing mechanisms of México’s cartels have expanded ‘business’ 
operations into a diversified field of illicit activity. The Colombian cartels relied on drug 
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profits and money laundering to finance their respective systems.236 Mexican cartels such 
as Los Zetas or the Knights Templar finance through extortion, prostitution, oil and gas 
syphoning, illegal mining of precious metals,237 and pirated DVDs.238 This diversity 
affords cartels the potential ability to contain any successful law enforcement efforts 
aimed at drug activities. Furthermore, it creates a more complex environment than what 
was faced by Colombian police forces. Such differences suggest that replicating the 
Colombian law enforcement model would not effectively address the security situation 
faced by Mexican forces. Despite these differences, there are a number of parallels to the 
Colombian study. Accordingly, Colombia’s model provides valuable lessons learned that 
are essential to the development of a sound Mexican law enforcement strategy. 
C. SIMILARITIES BETWEEN THE EARLIER COLOMBIAN CARTEL 
SYSTEM AND MÉXICO’S MODERN-DAY CRIMINAL 
ORGANIZATIONS 
History’s lessons, particularly in Colombia’s targeting of “system components” 
similar to those of Mexican cartels, allow Mexican law enforcement to develop an 
informed strategy to engage its country’s various criminal organizations. An analysis of 
the cartels in both environments suggests similar contributions through coercive violence, 
the discrediting of authority, and aggressive bribery efforts. Furthermore, various inputs, 
conversion mechanisms, and violent effects on authority give the impression that the 
Mexican cartel system is in many ways a rough reflection of its Colombian predecessors. 
The majority of coercive and persuasive tactics used by Mexican cartels tend to 
reflect the efforts of Colombian godfathers throughout the 1980s and early 1990s. 
Kidnappings, torture, and murder affect regions of México just as they did in Colombia. 
One might argue that countless decapitations, even the dissolving of corpses in acid, 
suggest that México’s coercive tactics have exceeded the efforts of Medellín and Cali. 
Additionally, both case studies cite widespread attempts to discredit authority through 
any available platform. Parallel to these slanderous activities is a dedicated pursuit to buy 
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complicity. Colombian cartels bribed security forces at all levels, from low-level 
patrolmen to generals.239 Similarly, Mexican cartels annually spend over one billion 
dollars in bribes of law enforcement and politicians.240 Not surprisingly, these similarities 
continue into the majority of inputs and conversion mechanisms at the core of cartel 
systems in both countries. 
The Mexican cartel system operates through the next generation of inputs and 
conversion mechanisms when compared to its Colombian predecessors. While subtle 
differences distinguish current cartels from Medellín and Cali, the core elements are quite 
similar. Cali godfathers secured vital information from local citizens by contributing to 
the local economy.241 Twenty five years later, Mexican cartels employ local spy 
networks to secure vital information.242 An association of legitimate radio stations was 
funded by Cali in order to ensure positive press on the cartel’s activities.243 Mexican 
cartels use news, internet, and even musical ballads to promote their agendas in a 
respectable light.244  
In addition to cartel inputs and activities, there are similarities in the general 
structure of their respective organizations. Criminal organizations in both studies operate 
in a centralized structure. In the same way Pablo Escobar controlled every aspect of his 
cartel’s cocaine trade, “El Chapo” Guzman obsessively maintained strict oversight of the 
Sinaloa cartel’s narcotics distribution. With compartmented logistical networks, focus on 
intelligence, and evolving communications methods, Mexican cartels appear to be an 
extension of what the Colombian framework might look like if the organizations from 
Medellín and Cali survived into the twenty-first century. Understanding the similarities 
and differences between the two studies can assist in determining which aspects of  
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Colombian law enforcement strategy might appropriately address the Mexican problem, 
while eliminating efforts that are either unique to Colombia or simply do not apply to 
México’s security strategy. 
D. A MEXICAN LAW ENFORCEMENT MODEL: HOW TO APPLY 
ELEMENTS OF COLOMBIA’S MODEL TO CREATE A UNIQUE AND 
EFFECTIVE MEXICAN STRATEGY 
The law enforcement model used by the CNP against the Medellín and Cali 
cartels contains several features that appropriately address challenges against the various 
criminal organizations in México. First, a strategy must nest with a committed national 
policy to reduce the cartels’ reach and regain control over contested regions of the 
country. Law enforcement must have the ability to leverage national policy to reduce 
criminal organizations. Second, a dedicated Mexican law enforcement entity, unified in 
command, must focus on the defeat of organized crime. Cooperation amongst all 
participating security forces is paramount to the success of such a strategy. Third, the 
growth of enduring international partnerships that bring unique capabilities and 
experience to Mexican security forces is essential. Most sensitive to this pillar is the 
development of partnerships that fit within the guidelines of the Mexican constitution. 
Fourth, an enduring integration with the local populace, particularly with respect to the 
country’s growing vigilante movement, to establish an information advantage against 
criminal organizations that facilitates effective targeting against the cartel system. Such a 
strategy integrates all available resources in a concerted effort to defeat México’s cartel 
system through support from the local populace, and permits enduring stability in 
México’s most volatile regions. 
1. Government Policy: Extradition 
Any law enforcement strategy must nest within the support of a sound national 
policy against the cartels. In Colombia, one of the most significant points of leverage 
involved the policy of extradition to the United States. The Colombian government 
repeatedly issued decrees to amend extradition policy and persuade cartel leaders to 
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surrender to authorities.245 Flexibility in extradition policy provided the necessary 
leverage to negotiate the surrender of mid to high level cartel leadership. 
Similar to Colombia, Mexican cartel leaders strongly oppose extradition to the 
United States, as witnessed by lawyers’ petition to block extradition of “El Chapo” 
Guzman after his arrest in February 2014.246 Although extradition can provide a valuable 
bargaining chip, an important caveat is that México must not completely dismiss 
extradition to the United States, as certain individuals are better confined in US prisons. 
Nonetheless, a flexible extradition policy allows law enforcement the ability to negotiate 
surrender of cartel leadership, which provides a secondary benefit of crucial information 
to deplete the cartels’ personnel structure.  
2. Law Enforcement Reform 
Colombia’s main effort against the drug cartels was appropriately assigned to the 
nation’s federal police force. In México, widespread corruption and lack of confidence in 
police forces required the military to take the lead in operations against the cartels. While 
specialized military units, particularly the Fuerzas Especiales de la Fuerza de Infantería 
de Marina (Mexican Navy’s elite Marine Special Forces), have proved effective at 
targeting cartel leadership, they are limited in their abilities to conduct sustained law 
enforcement activities. Units typically deploy for no longer than 90 days, which limits the 
units’ ability to build relationships and gather information.247 A dedicated police force, 
free of corruption and human rights abuses and competent in enduring law enforcement 
operations, is most appropriate to achieve lasting success against the cartels. 
Efforts have already begun in México through the development of a Gendarmería 
Nacional (National Gendarmerie), a paramilitary federal police division dedicated to the 
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provision of security in rural and marginalized areas.248 Similar to Colombia’s Search 
Bloc, unit members will be vetted, trained, and armed to restore order in areas of 
instability.249 Although the Search Bloc provided a direct action capability, México’s 
Gendarmería must be trained for an enduring presence in its respective areas of 
responsibility. Once security is established, the force should transition to enduring law 
enforcement activity.250 It is also recommended that it maintain authority to collect 
information in its respective areas of operation.251 
To maximize effectiveness, Mexican authorities must establish a clear line of 
coordination and unified command amongst the Gendarmería and participating forces. 
The need for military raids will likely persist, particularly against cartel leadership. 
Information must be shared and operations coordinated with the Gendarmería. 
Furthermore, it must be trained in population-focused, internal defense operations, 
similar in structure to village stability operations (VSO) practiced by United States Army 
Special Forces in Afghanistan. The Gendarmería faces a number of challenges in its 
development, employment, and sustainment. With a unified command, proper 
coordination, enduring presence, and appropriate training, this new federal police force 
brings a sense of optimism in the struggle to defeat México’s cartels. 
3. International Partnerships 
Paramount to Colombia’s accomplishments against the Medellín and Cali cartels 
was an intimate partnership with the United States, particularly with units from the 
military’s SOCOM and the DEA. The combination of technical surveillance assets, 
training capabilities, and human intelligence support enhanced CNP proficiencies in 
gathering reliable intelligence against the cartels. 
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International support to Mexican security forces is limited by constitutional 
constraints. Although the United States has vested interest in the defeat of Mexican 
cartels, anything involving U.S. combat troops is almost impossible. The Mexican 
Constitution clearly explains that national politics of self-determination do not permit any 
intervention by foreign forces.252 Nonetheless, Mexican forces participate in training 
programs hosted by several international partners, including the United States, France, 
and Colombia.253 Furthermore, the United States currently provides equipment support, 
including Blackhawk helicopters and surveillance drones.254 Continued support is 
necessary to the success of Mexican forces, particularly the newly created Gendarmería. 
With close geographical proximity, Mexican law enforcement assigned to target the 
cartels might benefit from a lasting relationship with U.S. Special Forces, who specialize 
in the internal defense operations that specifically apply to cartel activity. Just as 
important as the defeat of the cartels is an ability to work with and through the local 
populace. Such skills are a necessary tool in México’s current environment, particularly 
with the country’s growing vigilante movement. 
4. Integration at the Local Level 
A close relationship and support of the local populace is arguably the most 
important element of a successful model against organized crime. Similar to the CNP, 
Mexican security forces have yet to succeed in gaining any ground in the battle for 
information at the local level. Cartel presence and intimidation contributes to its 
advantage in information against government forces.  
In Colombia, two dynamics allowed the CNP to gain popular support and pursue 
a strategy that integrated the procurement of valuable information. First, a series of 
spectacular attacks by Pablo Escobar and the Medellín cartel resulted in a significant shift 
in popular opinion against the cartel. Colombians no longer saw the cartel as a harmless 
                                                 
252 Anonymous (b), Mexican military officer, interview with the author, January 29, 2014. 
253 “Commanders of México’s New Police Force being Trained in France and Colombia.” 
254 Ioan Grillo, “U.S. Troops Increase Aid to México in Drug War,” National Public Radio, October 6, 
2011, accessed April 3, 2014, http://www.npr.org/2011/10/06/141128178/u-s-troops-increase-aid-to-
México-in-drug-war. 
 68 
evil, and preferred that Colombian authorities pursue an aggressive strategy to rid the 
country of such a violent organization. 255 Second was the formation of Los Pepes, a 
covert organization composed of locals and rival Cali cartel members. Although illegal, 
this group added the element of a quasi-vigilante force that could infiltrate the cartel 
system’s information inputs. Due to the sensitivity of working with an illegal group, the 
CNP maintained clandestine collaboration with Los Pepes, but immensely benefited from 
their working relationship.256 
Mexican law enforcement currently find themselves in a similar situation. 
Citizens have grown tired of intimidation and extortion of local families and businesses. 
In many instances, cartels like Los Zetas and the Knights Templar have exceeded the 
threshold of acceptable violence. The state of Michoacán provides an appropriate 
example, where despondent locals developed a series of robust vigilante groups to regain 
territory from the Knights Templar. Initially, the Mexican government opposed these 
vigilante groups and sought to disband them. In January 2014, the government reversed 
its position and welcomed the vigilante groups under the constitutionally established 
Cuerpos de Fuerzas Rurales (Rural Defense Corps), or simply called Rurales.257 
According to regulations, these forces fall under the Ministry of National Defense and 
cooperate with the Mexican Army’s chain of command, but ultimately answer to their 
respective state governments.258 As the Gendarmería fall under the federal police, a 
constitutionally acceptable command structure must ensure the Rural Defense Corps 
operates under legal jurisdiction.  
Pairing rural defense groups with professionally trained personnel has the 
potential to devastate the cartels. Unlike Los Pepes, the Rurales is a legitimized security  
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force. With an appropriate vetting process and training in both tactics and human rights, 
Mexican authorities can fully employ the Rurales to attack the cartel system, gain an 
information advantage, and defeat cartels.  
E. CONCLUSION 
The Mexican problem is not the same as Colombia’s, and a cookie-cutter 
approach using Colombia’s law enforcement model is not the solution. Colombia battled 
with two drug trafficking organizations; México faces more than 10 powerful criminal 
organizations with a diversified criminal structure and rampant extortion with a focus on 
any form of profitable activity. Nevertheless, various operations that made up the 
Colombian cartel system are applicable to México’s current criminal organizations. An 
effective law enforcement strategy resembles a hybrid version of the Colombian model. 
First, nesting the strategy with national policy, particularly in extradition, allows law 
enforcement to leverage such policy against the cartels. Second, robust reform combined 
with a distinct and unified command permits the creation and employment of a reputable 
federal police force, supported by military action when required. Third, international 
partnerships and collaboration continue to expand within constitutional limitations, 
allowing for maximum benefit of available resources. Finally, a calculated approach to 
partnership with armed citizen groups provides an irreplaceable tool in infiltrating the 
cartels’ information flow. The combination of elements provides an enduring framework 
to reduce violence to acceptable levels and regain security in all regions, restoring 
México’s reputation as a growing and stable environment. 
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VI. A HYBRID APPROACH: MODIFYING COLOMBIA’S LAW 
ENFORCEMENT MODEL TO FIT CONTEMPORARY MÉXICO 
The general structure of México’s cartels is superficially similar to its Colombian 
predecessors, but there are numerous inputs and conversion mechanisms within the 
Mexican cartel system that suggest a unique problem and require a specific law 
enforcement response. Correspondingly, a hybrid version of Colombia’s law enforcement 
model is necessary to succeed in reducing the power and influence of organized crime 
and restoring stability in affected regions of México. 
The Colombian cartels of the late twentieth century centered their illicit activities 
on the production, transportation, and distribution of illegal narcotics. Any associated 
activities within the system were to complement and support drug trafficking operations. 
In México, organized crime has expanded its size and depth to include numerous 
activities outside of drug trafficking operations. Drug interdiction efforts that emulate the 
Colombian law enforcement model will likely have a marginal impact on such a 
diversified system of financing mechanisms.  
Nonetheless, the Mexican cartel system retains a number of attributes that were 
essential to Colombian organized crime. Centralized control, the use of violence, 
intimidation, and bribery, and the pursuit of information remain constant in contemporary 
organized crime. These attributes are important in understanding the applicability of 
Colombia’s law enforcement model to México’s current problem. 
The Colombian law enforcement model targeted virtually all conversion 
mechanisms of the cartel system, including the personnel structure (kingpin strategy), 
financing, logistics, intelligence, and communication. It developed a specialized federal 
police unit, relatively absent of corruption, and dedicated to the defeat of the Medellín 
and Cali cartels. The Colombian government maintained a flexible extradition policy that 
allowed law enforcement leadership to leverage such policy in negotiations with 
numerous cartel leaders. Additionally, it incorporated unique capabilities from SOCOM 
and the DEA to professionalize the force and gather information regarding cartel 
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structure and operations. Finally, Colombian law enforcement covertly cooperated with 
an illegal vigilante force (Los Pepes) to reduce the cartels’ information advantage. 
Colombia’s federal police defeated the cartels’ ability to exist as large and overt 
organizations, influence authority at the highest levels, and conduct acts of mass violence 
with impunity. Law enforcement efforts did very little to defeat drug production, 
trafficking, and distribution. The result was the creation of numerous cartelitos, or small 
cartels, covert in their drug trafficking operations and limited in capacity for large-scale 
violence.  
Can the Colombian law enforcement model apply to the existing struggle against 
powerful organized crime in México? Currently, the majority of Mexican citizens prefer 
that law enforcement target the cartels’ ability to intimidate and extort the local populace 
over efforts to disrupt illicit narcotics operations.259 If the goal is the elimination of drug 
trafficking operations, Colombia’s model has little application. If the Mexican 
government seeks to reduce the power, influence, and violence of organized crime, a 
modified version of the Colombian law enforcement model provides a relevant 
framework. The creation of a Gendarmería is similar to Colombia’s Search Bloc in that it 
represents a reorganization of the federal police to address organized crime, however it 
should differ in its core mission to combat the cartels. While the Search Bloc focused on 
raids and other kinetic strikes to target cartel leadership, the Gendarmería should focus 
on a long term reinvention of the federal police and enduring strategy to establish a 
strong relationship  
with the local populace. As Colombia permitted direct support from U.S. Special 
Operations, México should consider developing a similar approach that still ensures 
compliance with constitutionally mandated non-intervention policies. Finally, where 
Colombia benefited from cooperation with an illegal vigilante force, Mexican forces can 
develop a legitimate relationship with rural defenses who may have access to invaluable 
information on cartel structure and activities. A strategy that nests in national policy, 
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focuses on reform, and targets information contributions of the cartel system can set the 
conditions to effectively reduce cartel size, power, and influence, restore security in all 
regions, and allow for the pursuit of growth and prosperity in a stable Mexican 
environment. 
At the same time, I identify several issues associated with México’s problems, but 
which lie beyond the scope of this thesis. First, deeper problems related to social 
inequality and rural and urban poverty should be addressed to further weaken organized 
crime. Second, the proposed model is meant to reduce the existence of large and 
influential cartels, decrease violence to manageable levels, and bring enduring security to 
all regions of México. Similar to Colombia, an enduring network of smaller cartelitos is 
likely to assume drug production and trafficking after a successful defeat of the large 
cartels. Complementary research is still necessary to deal with the trafficking and 
consumption of illegal drugs. Lastly, international support is paramount to the success of 
Mexican security forces. A study should consider the most efficient coordination 
measures to pursue amongst international partners as well as U.S. inter-agency 
participation. While the model being proposed here represents an important start, there is 
a need for more research on the depth and breadth of organized crime in México as part 
of any effort to improve law enforcement south of the border.  
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